

THE

CICERONIAN;

OR,

THE PRUSSIAN METHOD

OF TEACHING THE

ELEMENTS OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE.

ADAPTED TO

THE USE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS.

BY B. SEARS.

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PREFACE.

Dr. Ernest Ruthardt, of Breslau, published, in the year 1839, a small volume, proposing improvements in the method of teaching the Latin and Greek classics, as the result of much experience both on his own part and on that of several of his literary friends. The Prussian Minister of Education was so pleased with it as to order a copy for every gymnasium in the kingdom. He, at the same time, requested the teachers to direct their attention to the subject, and, afterwards, to express their opinions upon it. The consequence has been a very general approbation of the method, and its adoption in about a hundred gymnasia.

In 1841, the author published the work in an enlarged form, in which he made use of numerous suggestions from different teachers, and reviewers in the critical journals. It is from this work that the general principles have been taken which are now presented to the public. It was deemed proper, however, to draw up a summary of them in an independent form, and to make such modifications as to adapt the system to the condition of American schools.

As the author's *Loci Memoriales*, or passages from the Latin classics, selected for the purpose of exemplifying the system, were not the result of so much labor as the other work, the undertaking of Professors Meiring and Rémacly, of Düren, to examine the writings of Cicero for the purpose of making a more careful and perfect

selection, was hailed by the teachers in the German gymnasia as an acceptable service. The public expectation has not been disappointed. The volume prepared by them is a collection of gems. A second edition, with a careful revision of the text and the orthography, appeared in 1843, from which all the selections here presented, except the last, are taken.

At the suggestion of several distinguished teachers in Boston and vicinity, to whose inspection the work has been submitted, some further aid than was originally contemplated has been hesitatingly rendered to young teachers, by prefixing to the Latin selections a few pages of notes, or exercises, as illustrations of the manner of teaching. Those who do not need them will pass them by; and others, who cannot regard them as specimens, will accept them as hints.

By the advice of the same gentlemen, a few simpler sentences from Cicero have been placed at the end of these notes, and before the other selections, for the benefit of younger pupils.

An examination of the plan of instruction will show that a glossary, and complete body of notes, by way of commentary, to render the study easy, would, in a great measure, defeat the end proposed. The process of making out the meaning constitutes the most important part of the pupil's employment, as well as the teacher's. In languages, no less than in mathematics, those commentaries, which give to the student the result without the labor of the process, are ruinous to scholarship.

B. S.

NEWTON, *May* 1, 1844.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

Acad. . . . . = Academicæ Quæstiones.
Ad. Brut. . . . . = Epistolæ ad Brutum.
Arch. . . . . = Oratio pro Archia Poeta.
Att. . . . . = Epistolæ ad Atticum.

Balb. . . . . = Oratio pro Balbo.
Brut. . . . . = Brutus, *or* De Claris Oratoribus.

Cæcil. . . . . = Oratio in Cæcilium.
Cæl. . . . . = Oratio pro Cælio.
Cat. . . . . = Oratio in Catilinam.
Cato. . . . . = Cato Major, *or* De Senectute.
Cluent. . . . . = Oratio pro Cluentio.

Dejot. . . . . = Oratio pro Dejotaro.
De Or. . . . . = De Oratore.
Div. . . . . = De Divinatione.

Fam. . . . . = Epistolæ ad Familiares, *or* ad Diversos.
Fin. . . . . = De Finibus.
Flac. . . . . = Oratio pro Flacco.
Fragm. Orat. . . = Fragmenta Orationum.

Heren. . . . . = Ad Herennium.

Inv. . . . . = De Inventione.

Læl. . . . . = Lælius, *or* De Amicitia.
Leg. . . . . = De Legibus.

Marcel. . . . . = Oratio pro Marcello.
Mil. . . . . = Oratio pro Milone.
Muren. . . . . = Oratio pro Murena.

N. D. . . . . = De Natura Deorum.

Off. . . . . = De Officiis.
Or. . . . . = Orator.

Parad. . . . . = Paradoxon.
Parad. Procem. . = Paradoxon, Procemium.
Part. Orat. . . . . = De Partitione Oratoria.
P. Dom. ad Pont. = Oratio pro Domo ad Pontifices.
Phil. . . . . = Oratio Philippica.
Pis. . . . . = Oratio in Pisonem.
Planc. . . . . = Oratio pro Plancio.
P. Leg. Man. . . = Oratio pro Lege Manilia.
Prov. Cons. . . . = Oratio de Provinciis Consularibus.

Quint. . . . . = Oratio pro Quintio.
Quir. p. Red. . . = Oratio ad Quirites post Reditum.

Rab. Post. . . . . = Oratio pro Rabirio Postumo.
Resp. . . . . = De Re Publica.
Rosc. A. . . . . = Oratio pro Roscio Amerino.
Rosc. Com. . . . = Oratio pro Roscio Comœdo.

Sext. . . . . = Oratio pro Sextio.
Sull. . . . . = Oratio pro Sulla.

Top. . . . . = Topica.
Tusc. . . . . = Tusculanæ Disputationes *or* Quæstiones.

Verr. . . . . = Oratio in Verrem.

PLAN OF INSTRUCTION.

THE plan of instruction presented in the following pages is only in a modified sense original. This circumstance, however, so far from being an objection to the system, will be regarded, by men of reflection, as presumptive evidence in its favor. Indeed, of the many revolutions that have taken place in the mode of education, few have proved to be of permanent utility. In the plan which is about to be submitted, the groundwork of good existing methods is supposed to remain, while the various improvements of modern times are combined and systematized according to one leading principle. To pretend that there is any thing new in committing choice specimens from the Latin or Greek classics to memory, or in arranging studies, with a regular gradation, from the simpler elements to the more

difficult combinations, or in selecting a small part of classical literature, and making the thorough study of it an introduction to the remainder, would be preposterous. The merit of Dr. Ruthardt, the author of the system, consists rather in tracing all these and other similar improvements to a radical principle, and in devising a way for carrying it out in practice, with unity of purpose and symmetry of form.

A moderate quantity of the purest and best Latin prose, in selections, is made the basis of the pupil's knowledge of the language. The selections are arranged systematically, both with reference to the subjects and to the construction of sentences. The study of these is to commence simultaneously with that of the grammar, and to be carried on, first by an ordinary preparation on them, then by committing them to memory, and finally by very frequent reviews. What is thus learned is to be made the life and soul of all grammatical instruction, the germ of all future acquisitions in the language. The author's fundamental principle is thus pointedly expressed in his own words: "What we need is solid ground to stand upon that we can call our own, of which we can never be sure, except when it is under our feet rather than under our eye."

The demand which, very early after the revival of learning, was made by the masters of modern Latin composition, that a store of classical Latinity should be treasured up in the memory for future use, has always been allowed. But the execution of the design has been uniformly attended with great difficulty. If the young pupil load his memory with that which he does not yet know how to apply in practice, he will be obliged either to pass from one subject to another, learning much, and, at the same time, forgetting much, or to carry, for many years, a cumbrous aggregate of disconnected matter in his memory, not only with great effort, but without the encouragement resulting from seeing its use. If, on the other hand, he wait till a later period, so that he may be able to apply his acquisitions as fast as they are made, he will lose the most favorable time for employing the memory, and be obliged to consume half of his maturer years in making preparation for the remainder.

It is believed that not far from a hundred pages can be selected, mostly in short and perfect sentences, from the works of Cicero, which shall contain the substance of the ordinary forms and constructions of the Latin language. The perfect mastery of all the principles involved in

these, would not only secure the most exact mental discipline, but lay the most solid foundation for future attainments in philology. It would place one, as it were, in the capital of a country, and render it easy for him to make excursions in any direction, at pleasure. Such a mode of procedure would fix in the mind a definite standard of Latinity, by which corruptions, archaisms, and poetic forms could, with ease and certainty, be detected. Furthermore, acquisitions once made, would, by means of various repetitions and new investigations, be securely retained. What would seem to be lost in surface would be made up in depth. The language would insinuate itself more readily and be more intimately blended with all one's habits of thought. Its grammar and idiom would soon have little or nothing of a foreign air. Common words and common forms of expression would have that precedence of others which is their birthright, and a much earlier facility and pleasure in reading would be one of the immediate consequences. In our elementary grammars, the examples are not drawn chiefly from the prose writers of the golden age, but promiscuously from different writers of almost every age, and the deviations from the common standard of Latin construction are

rarely pointed out. In the course of reading, too, pursued in many schools, a boy is introduced to the study of the poetic delicacies of a language before he has sufficient knowledge to make out the sense of the simplest prose, or, what is no less absurd, to the rhetorical style employed in the highest strains of oratory, before a grammatical blunder, or a barbarism of the coarsest sort could be detected. Many such evils which have sometimes crept into our Latin schools, and which have often been lamented as incurable, find, in no small degree, a remedy in the course of instruction here prescribed.

In estimating the merits of such a system, it is important not to confound the principles which apply to the mature scholar with those which ought to be inculcated upon the beginner. The method best adapted to discipline the powers of the latter, would, if adopted by the former, lead to limited and partial views. On the other hand, the extensive reading of Latin authors, which is indispensable to the critic, would lead to nothing but shallowness and confusion with the young pupil. In acquiring the elements of knowledge, it is not so much expansiveness that is wanted, as accuracy. A narrow compass of vision is most favorable to that close inspection and nice observation which must be

made the starting-point in all elementary instruction. When the pupil shall have learned perfectly the more common elements of grammar, by studying, committing to memory, and re-investigating again and again a suitable quantity of well chosen Latin prose, he will be found to possess a feeling of assurance and a consciousness of power, that will render the exertion of his faculties in the study of the language a delight rather than a task. Nor will he merely escape the unwelcome conviction that he is daily loosing his hold upon his early acquisitions, or the oppressiveness of the attempt to retain more than his memory can grasp, but his perfect familiarity with what he has treasured up will lead to a discovery of its uses in a multiplicity of instances that would otherwise pass unnoticed. The entire amount of elementary study ought, therefore, to be concentrated, and kept within narrow bounds, so that none of the acquisitions made, can, for a moment, be out of reach. When the simplest principles are not only comprehended but deeply fixed in the mind, the circle of knowledge can be gradually enlarged. This last step, however, must always be taken with much care, in order that the accessory matter may have an organic connection with the original germ, and receive vitality

from it. Instead of dismissing preceding lessons on advancing to others, the learner should constantly be led back to a reconsideration of the former, that he may trace out more perfectly their connections with the latter, and penetrate more deeply into their nature and spirit. In no other way can he bring his successive attainments under one complete view, or remain undisputed master of the field he has won.

As to the exercise of the memory, it is well known that it precedes, in the order of nature, that of most of the other mental faculties. It may therefore be vigorously employed while they are but just beginning to be developed. It is but following the law of nature, to employ the memory early upon materials that are adapted to prepare the way for other and higher exercises of the mind. The reciprocal influence of these faculties upon each other will be obvious upon a moment's consideration. The process of the memory is threefold, the clear apprehension of the subject, the act of fixing it deeply in the mind, and the power of recalling it at pleasure. The memory, therefore, involves the employment of the intellect, and the exercise of the intellect essentially aids the memory. Now the method of instruction here described is in harmony with these facts. At the commencement

of the course of study the memory is fully employed, but the understanding is gradually brought into exercise, and the transition from the one to the other is natural and easy. From all that has been said, it will appear, that neither the amount of what is committed to memory, nor a mechanical familiarity with set phrases can be our principal aim. The end proposed will be brought more distinctly to view by attention to the following inquiries:

What materials from the works written in the Latin language, should be chosen to constitute the basis of elementary instruction? We have abundant experience to show how unsafe it is to trust even the best modern writers of Latin, to give us their own compositions as a specimen of classical literature. Much time has been lost, if not worse than lost, in attempting to learn pure Latin from a corrupt source. It is true, we are not to seek among the remains of Roman literature for a work written with a view to furnishing us with a complete course of elementary reading. The best that can be done, is to select single but perfect sentences, and classify them according to the wants of the pupil. The selections, however, must not be made indiscriminately from whatever may chance to have been written by the ancients. If the good and the

bad, the obsolete forms and the later, and all the varieties of style, were to be thrown together, such a motley mixture could not fail to produce confusion in the mind of the pupil at the very outset. A definite period of Roman literature should be chosen,—which can be no other than the golden age; a particular kind of composition, —which would, of course, be simple prose; and the style of some one writer, or at most, two or three writers, who best represent the true genius of the Roman language, and no writer has a better claim to this distinction than Cicero. Selections even from his works, may not be made at random. Only those passages can be adopted, which are simple and natural, and yet so rich in grammatical principles that they may be constantly resorted to for illustration. They should, furthermore, convey ideas and sentiments of such intrinsic value, that one's interest in them will not be lost by frequent repetition. In a word, nothing deserves a place in such a collection, except that which, both in respect to the idea and the form of expression, is worth remembering to the end of life.

How large an amount of Latin will need to be learned in the way proposed, in order to the happiest result? No exact measure can be given of what is required for this purpose. It

can only be said in general terms, that less than would be adequate to a full representation of all the forms and constructions which commonly occur in simple classic prose would fail to secure the object in view; while it would be unsafe, on the other hand, to attempt to crowd into the memory more than it can securely retain through life. The estimate will vary, partly according to the nature of the selections, as they may be more or less judiciously made, and partly according to the skill and invention of the teacher, as he may be more or less fertile in drawing out from a passage the grammatical principles contained in it or suggested by it.

What method should be adopted for fixing the selections in the memory? Clearly, that which gives fullest play to all the powers of the mind. Artificial mnemonic aids are worse than useless, inasmuch as they produce an unthinking, mechanical familiarity with mere words, a pitiable substitute for knowledge, and repress the exercise of the judgment and the taste. The object of studying Latin is not the power of rehearsal, but an accurate knowledge of the facts, and a comprehension of the principles of the language. The rules which should regulate the employment of the memory in general, will be explained in another connection.

It is not the least of the advantages of this method, that it requires the teacher to go through the same process with the pupil. One of the principal hindrances to successful teaching is the want of sympathy between teacher and pupil. Where one's knowledge is of so long standing that the ardor of acquisition is lost and the processes by which it was made forgotten, some fresh study to revive old impressions and awaken new interest, becomes indispensable. Other things being equal, that individual who is himself making the most rapid progress in his studies, will impart the most interest to his pupils. Fire cannot communicate itself after it has gone out. Besides, it is now pretty generally conceded that neither long lessons learned from books by private study, nor instruction given by formal dictation is adapted to a young pupil. He needs shorter tasks, and more frequent exercises with his teacher. If these can be protracted, and, by a free intercourse, a perfect interchange of thought effected; if the instructer can come down entirely to the pupil's degree of knowledge, and have the patience to watch assiduously all his processes of thought, and sympathize with him as a friend and parent, not only will the exercise itself be made agreeable and instructive, but it will awaken a permanent interest, and furnish

the best guide for private study. Animated and familiar conversation, limited to the points in question, is admirably fitted to enlist all the powers of the youthful mind. Nothing is so important, at the outset, as to have a teacher, who, with an intellect not only well disciplined and furnished, but interested and active, and a warm and sympathizing heart, can stand before his class as the living expositor of all that is taught. All the powers of such a teacher's mind come in contact with those of the pupil, and have a forming influence upon them. Only he who gives out the whole man in teaching, can call forth the whole man in those who are taught. But it is not enough of preparation that the instructer have the principles of the language at ready command; he must also be familiar with the tasks of the class,—with all the selections which have been committed to memory by them, so that he may be able, at any moment, to call up for illustration whatever has occurred in previous lessons. Let him not be alarmed at the suggestion. Nothing can be more profitable to him, or give him a livelier interest in his occupation. It will both facilitate his own studies and increase his power in teaching. Many things contained in a sentence, which would escape observation in reading, will

attract attention if the passage is carried in the memory. In one's walks and hours of retirement, when the mind spontaneously returns to the subjects about which it has been employed, the happiest thoughts will often occur, to give richness and variety to instruction and illustration. The same habit of study and of reflection would be not less favorable to the exercise of judgment in assigning lessons, than to giving skill and awakening enthusiasm in teaching.

With these observations we dismiss the general view of the subject, and proceed to explain its special application to the series of selections from the writings of Cicero which make up the second part of this volume. The work is chiefly designed for such an elementary course of study as shall enable the student to understand an ordinary prose writer without much difficulty. So far as practicable, the study of it should precede the reading of the classics. In those unhappy cases, where students wish to enter college as speedily as possible, and where, consequently, more regard is paid to some degree of familiarity with a certain number of Latin authors than to a knowledge of the Latin language, it is hardly to be expected that much of the second course will be studied before a beginning shall be made in reading the books pre-

scribed for admission to the colleges. Wherever it shall be necessary, the latter part of the book can be associated with such reading, and made a collateral exercise which may be held weekly or semi-weekly. For reasons which have already been stated, the quantity of matter selected could not be reduced to adapt it to the state of particular schools. A sufficient amount to secure the object in view is provided for all who may use the work; and the division of it into courses, which is, to a great extent, arbitrary, may be varied according to circumstances. The successive steps from the first lesson to the last are the same, whatever be the time allotted for preparatory study or the method pursued.

INTRODUCTORY EXERCISES.

At the beginning only so much of the grammar should be committed to memory as is indispensable to the reading of the simplest sentence. The sooner the elements of grammar, which are learned, are put to use the more agreeable and profitable will it be for the learner. As the grammar is, according to our plan, to be taught in several successive courses, with a gradual increase at each time, the first course will scarcely

need comprise more than the regular forms of nouns of the first and second declensions, the corresponding forms of the adjective, two or three examples which most fully represent the third declension of nouns, the more common pronouns, and so much from the verbs as is required for reading a few of the first sentences in the Introductory Exercises. Every thing thus learned from the grammar ought to be exemplified in as many ways as possible from the sentences studied. The words which occur in these sentences will take the place of the examples given in the grammar, as the latter will be neither so interesting nor so well understood as the former. During the study of the Introductory Exercises, the attention of the pupil ought to be directed chiefly not only to etymology, but to its regular forms of declension and conjugation. As the illustration of these will be the principal object of study at first, progress in the knowledge of them will be very nearly in the inverse ratio to progress in reading. It is needless to say, that the portions of the grammar, which are studied at this time, should be so perfectly committed to memory as never to be forgotten. Further details as to the manner of teaching at this period are rendered unnecessary by what will be said below.

FIRST COURSE.

The first business of the teacher, in regard to the Latin selections, will be to give the student a clear apprehension of the words, and the meaning of the sentence. The passage may then be studied anew and committed to memory. In his first attempt to learn it by heart, the pupil need not aim at any thing beyond a moderate degree of perfection. He should next be examined as to his recollection and comprehension of the explanations already given by the teacher. Repetitions of the same lesson from memory should not follow in immediate succession, but at intervals of not less than twenty-four hours. In order to avoid a monotonous formality, the repetition may be conducted, at each time, with a different object in view. All the topics in grammar and all the facts and principles of the Latin language may serve in turn for this purpose, and thus an endless variety may be given to these exercises.

At one time the regular declension of nouns, adjectives and pronouns may be attended to, and all the examples pointed out; at a later period, the more common irregular forms; then the gender of nouns in connection with the general rules, the classification of nouns of the third declension, the form of the genitive, and the euphonic changes of the nominative; the various

classes of adjectives as to declension, comparison and derivation; the difference in form and in signification of similar pronouns, as *hic*, *ille*, *is*, *iste*, or *quis* and *qui;* the comparison of the first and second conjugations of verbs as to the form of their terminations and accent, and the relation of the third conjugation, and then of the fourth to these and to each other, and innumerable topics of the kind which will readily occur to every inventive mind.

After some progress has been made in committing sentences to memory, they can be constantly referred to for illustration in all the lessons on grammar. Soon the pupils themselves will be able to make use of these materials in reading and in private study. It will be no great evil, if some difficulties of grammar or of interpretation should remain after a passage has been recited more than once. As it will pass many times under review, these difficulties will often disappear of themselves. By such a process the mind of the student will necessarily be receiving new light continually. But besides this suggestive influence of repetition, there will be, in each review, a closer study of the original; the new acquisitions, made since the first reading, will be brought to the student's aid; and he will now be able to discover many things in the passage

which escaped him before. The exact signification of a word, its different shade of meaning from the English used in translation, the precise nature and use of the different cases, the import of the subjunctive mode and of particular tenses both in the subjunctive and the indicative, the force of certain prepositions and conjunctions,—all these and many other things will be understood better and better as the student advances, and consequently the simplest classical sentence will become more definite and expressive at each successive review.

The system of reviewing will be varied by the judgment of the teacher, according to the circumstances of the case. Much will depend upon his peculiar mode of teaching. For the sake of definiteness, however, we will present a specimen, which, it is hoped, will not be mistaken for a rule. Every lesson may be reviewed daily for three successive days; afterwards once in two days; then semi-weekly, weekly, semi-monthly, and, at last, monthly. In the following schedule the studies of about a month are represented; the week-days being numbered in order, the lessons, indicated by the letters of the alphabet, being placed on the left, and the reviews of these lessons indicated in the same way, being placed on the right.

Lesson.	*Day.*	*Review.*
A.	1	
	2	A.
B.	3	A.
	4	A, B.
C.	5	B.
	6	A, B, C.
D.	7	A, B, C.
	8	C, D.
E.	9	A, B, D.
	10	C, D, E.
F.	11	B, E.
	12	A, C, D, E, F.
G.	13	B, C, D, E, F.
	14	A, B, F, G.
H.	15	D, E, G.
	16	B, C, F, G, H.
I.	17	E, H.
	18	A, D, F, G, H, I.
J.	19	B, C, E, F, G, H, I.
	20	D, I, J.
K.	21	G, H, J.
	22	E, F, I, J, K.
L.	23	C, H, K.
	24	A, D, G, I, J, K, L.
M.	25	B, C, E, F, H, I, J, K, L.

The teacher will find no difficulty in carrying this system into execution, so far as the pupil's task in committing to memory is concerned. If the leading principle, in regard to the method of study, be preserved, the frequency of reviews,

the habit of illustrating every subject only from the lessons studied, and the process of incessantly investigating the same materials, will render the effort of memory easy and agreeable. There will be more difficulty in guarding against abuses in the manner of exercising the memory. A rapid and frequent perusal of a lesson, in a thoughtless way, merely for the purpose of learning it by heart, would have decidedly bad tendencies. The memory, when exercised without the understanding, becomes mechanical, and produces mental imbecility. The lesson should never be repeated, without being made a matter of study or reflection at the same time. The chief attention in a review should be given to some special inquiry in regard to the facts and principles of the Latin language, or some subject connected with Roman literature; the exercise of the memory should be made incidental and subordinate. Sometimes the practice of writing out the sentences will be found favorable to detaining the student's attention on single words. It will be well for him, when alone, thoughtfully to repeat whole passages aloud. He will thereby accustom his ear to the foreign sounds, and train it for the rhythm of the language, and, at the same time, come to perceive more accurately the nicer shades of thought, and feel more sensibly the spirit of the language. In the exercises of the

class, one member may be required to repeat the passage in Latin, another to translate it without delay into good English, or a particular passage may be called for in English, without the Latin. But the translation must, in each instance, be made anew, at the moment. If the version given be suspected to be an old one, either original or borrowed, and committed to memory, it may be criticised, and required to be varied according to any specified peculiarities. Whenever the student shall give evidence of hurrying thoughtlessly over a form of words learned by rote, he may be interrupted, at every word, with questions on quantity, form of declension, or of conjugation, the signification of words, and other similar subjects. The teacher may call for certain passages, not by giving the chapter or number, or the first word, but by asking in what sentence a particular word occurs; where else the same word is to be found; in what grammatical construction; where a similar word, or phrase, or sentiment, occurs; what the points of resemblance in the two cases are, and what the difference.

Great care should be taken, also, that the memory be not tasked with what is either unnecessary or premature. For a long time during this First Course, no more of syntax should be taught than its simpler and more

important rules. Nothing can be more injudicious than to encumber the memory, at this early period, with those forms and constructions which occur but a few times in the whole compass of Roman literature. Until our elementary grammars shall separate all the rare forms from the rest, and mark them for later study, the teacher will need to exercise great care and judgment in selecting for young students only that which essentially belongs to the common forms of speech. The Latin nouns declined after the Greek form ought not, in general, to be committed to memory till after the corresponding part of Greek grammar has been studied. This suggestion is the more important, as the instances of Latin nouns, thus declined, are much fewer according to the latest editions of the classics than they were according to the old editions which our grammars still follow. The study of abstract rules of grammar before the mind is prepared by examples to feel the need of them or to comprehend them, is unphilosophical and injudicious. This abuse is already beginning to be done away in our best schools. Few, it is hoped, now entertain the thought of compelling a boy to begin his Latin studies by committing to memory all those doubtful rules in respect to which grammarians themselves are disagreed, and which, in some

cases, would be just as true if converted into exceptions, and the exceptions made the rule. The beginner needs nothing but the facts of the language as seen with his own eyes, and the reference of these to principles which he can comprehend. He should, as far as possible, learn the nature of a principle from what occurs in his reading. When this has been ascertained by himself, or explained to him by his teacher, then he may, with advantage, be referred to the grammar for a broader view of the whole subject.

Early attention should be given also to the acquisition of a copious vocabulary of words. In nothing is more time lost than in the common way of learning the significations of words; and in nothing is there a greater deficiency among ordinary students in this country than in a knowledge of the words of the Latin language. Gesenius, the late celebrated Hebraist, once said, that after he was sixteen years of age, he had no occasion to use the Latin lexicon, except in critical investigations. Nor is this a peculiar case. Most of the German students before entering the universities can read any ordinary Latin book without the aid of a lexicon. A practice has extensively prevailed of learning promiscuously long vocabularies from books, and even committing to memory small dictionaries.

There are, however, many objections to such a method. Not only is the process very tedious, but the knowledge of the words thus acquired will be vague and incomplete. Besides, many cases will occur in which the pupil will have no conception of the idea represented by the word, or in which he will have only confused or imperfect ideas. Now as objects should be known before their names are learned, it becomes indispensable to select the names of known objects, or to make the idea plain before the word expressing it is committed to memory. Again, most words have several significations, all of which ought to be included under one general definition when they are learned. The various ends here proposed may best be gained by forming a vocabulary almost exclusively from the words which occur in the lessons. Let these be explained orally by the teacher, and afterwards written down by the pupil. Let them next be revised and corrected by the teacher, and then copied by the student into a book kept for the purpose, and committed to memory. The definitions should be simple and complete. The radical meaning of the word should always be given first, and then the secondary meanings traced to it. In this way the generic signification of words of known

objects will be learned in connection with the specific use of them in the passages where they occur. A word once learned thus, and written in a book, to be committed to memory and frequently reviewed, will hardly need to be looked out at all in the dictionary, except for the purpose of a more complete account of it. Nothing is more dispiriting and unprofitable than the unthinking and confused turning of the leaves of a dictionary for almost every sentence through a whole course of preparatory study. There is in this practice a flagitious abuse of the memory. It labors under every disadvantage. Words are learned without a knowledge of those things to which they are applied. An accidental meaning, perhaps, is selected, without any general view of the word. At a future time, the same word is looked out again, and another accidental meaning learned, and so the same word may, in the course of a year, be looked out twenty times, and yet a full and clear view of it never be gained. What is thus slowly and imperfectly acquired is not permanently secured, by being thoroughly studied and laid away in the memory.

But as the process of accumulating words in the manner proposed would be a little too slow for enabling the pupil early to read with ease and pleasure, derivatives and compounds may

be studied in connection with the roots and simple words. Some precautions, however, will be necessary. Let only those derivatives be learned at present which frequently occur in reading; which are easily associated with the primitive already learned; and which are of such a nature that they can be fully understood at this stage of study. These two classes of words, namely, those which occur in the lessons, and the derivatives or compounds of such as are simple roots, will swell a vocabulary with sufficient rapidity, without producing any of the vagueness or confusion referred to above. At a somewhat later period, the study of synonyms and the higher questions in lexicography can be attached to these exercises.

In the selections contained in this volume the teacher will find abundant materials for calling out his own resources, and for employing the most active minds to be found among his pupils. The plainest and easiest sentence may be made the vehicle of much solid instruction. Take, for example, the sentence, *orationis summa virtus est perspicuitas.* The three substantives all have endings which designate abstract ideas, but each in a peculiar way. The termination *io* belongs mostly to verbal nouns which express he action of the corresponding verbs. Thus,

from *orare*, to speak, is derived *oratio*, the act of speaking, or a speech. The termination, *tus*, with the genitive, *tutis*, belongs to denominatives, and denotes the abstract quality of the primitive, as *virtus*, the noble qualities which belong to *vir*, a man. The termination, *tas*, generally expresses the quality of the adjective from which the substantive is derived, as *perspicuitas*, from the adjective, *perspicuus*. The pupil may be required to point out the difference between these and other terminations of abstract nouns which have occurred in preceding lessons. Next, the gender of nouns with these endings may be attended to. With the word *perspicuus*, thus brought before the student, may be connected the character of adjectives in *uus* as verbal adjectives. Then the difference between verbal adjectives and participles may be explained. The uses of *per* in composition may also be pointed out at the same time. The word *oratio* should be compared, as to form, with *orator*, in connection with the supine *oratum*, from which both are derived. Then the derivation of *orare* should be traced back to *os*. The adjective *summus* is to be distinguished in sense from *supremus*, and both compared in form and in signification with *imus* and *infimus*. The substantive *summa* and the adverb *summum*

should be disposed of at the same time. Then the form and import of the sentence may be almost infinitely varied, by changing the words and the construction. Though such an exercise ought to be commenced in the First Course, yet, for the sake of unity and completeness of discussion, we reserve the treatment of that topic for the Second Course.

SECOND COURSE.

The language should be studied with a view to its being, at no distant period, understood without the aid even of a mental translation. However necessary it may be for us to convey our ideas, and even to fix them in our own minds by means of words, still the words and constructions of one language can never adequately represent those of another. There are also conceptions and combinations of thought, peculiar to a people and to their language. Nothing, therefore, can be more preposterous than the attempt to teach a language by means of printed translations. These defects, which the most critical scholar will acknowledge attach to the best version he can make, must, in the process of teaching, be supplied by minute explanations. Peculiar words or constructions may

be variously translated and thus approached on different sides, the remaining deficiency of representation always being pointed out. Thus the word *honestum* has a meaning which can be fully given by no English word. The definition, "*what is honorable*," includes some things which do not belong to the word, and omits others which do belong to it. "*What is fit or proper*," is defective in a similar respect. "*Virtue*" is too limited a definition, and conveys none of the peculiar coloring of the original word. The same is true of "*honor*," "*honesty*," and other definitions usually given. Still, by such a process as that proposed, a correct knowledge of the word may, at length, be acquired. At first, nothing of a foreign language can be understood by a pupil, except what is represented in our own, and the teacher will be obliged, for a time, to content himself with very imperfect approximations to the character of the original. Though at a later period, the exercise itself of translating will be continued, the student's dependence on it will be constantly diminishing. As he proceeds, he will, indeed, be able to give better versions, but he will also more clearly see their necessary imperfection. The force of the original will begin to be felt where it cannot be expressed; and soon the process of circumlocu-

tion will become tiresome and unnecessary, and the original itself will come to exert its direct power as immediately as though the English were not in existence. It is not till this last point is gained that the language is learned. Nothing so certainly as the thoroughness and the familiarity recommended in these pages, will tend to produce such a result.

In dwelling so long on a comparatively small amount of reading, the teacher will be liable to experience some difficulty from the impatience of his class. But the young must be taught to hasten slowly. They may be made to see the evil of hastening away from a new and important lesson before it is perfectly mastered. It can easily be shown, even to their comprehension, that a student may have read and studied many words without giving them a permanent place in his mind; that he may have observed a multitude of peculiar Latin constructions, and yet that these, for want of being concentrated by systematic study, and fixed by frequent review, may lie in obscurity and in disorder in his memory; that he may have a thousand uncertain and vague reminiscences of classic words and classic forms of expression, without being able to pronounce with confidence upon the purity or correctness of a single Latin sentence.

He who has himself right views on the subject, will find no special trouble in convincing a boy of ordinary comprehension that the protracted and critical study of a small amount of simple Latin prose will be the speediest as well as surest way of gaining a distinct knowledge of the language. A teacher whose spirit is always active, who can point out new things in old subjects, and bring a rich variety of truth around an elementary principle, will be able to create and keep up an intellectual excitement which will banish tedium and listlessness from the schoolroom.

As the pupils make progress in the language, a similar progress must be made in the character of the exercises. A course of grammatical instruction should now be carried out and completed in all its parts. All the incidental explanations that have been made in regard to the forms of the parts of speech, and all the preliminary courses of instruction on this part of the grammar should now be brought under one systematic view and thoroughly treated. The syntax of the language, too, which, in the First Course, was taught only in its elements, will need to be taken up and studied in the same progressive way as was recommended for the first part of grammar. Familiar lectures or

oral discussions ought always to accompany the study of the grammar. Indeed, it is fatal to true philology, to adopt a book as authority in regard to the principles of grammar. Subjects must be investigated, principles discussed, grammarians criticised and corrected, and habits of reading with reference to settling certain points of inquiry, formed. No true scholarship can be acquired without such a course of instruction on the part of the teacher, and such a course of independent investigation ultimately on the part of the student.

After a large vocabulary of words, with their derivatives or roots, as the case may be, has been acquired, and the more important rules of derivation have been learned and practised, the whole subject of derivation should be treated in a systematic way. Most of our American schools would, in this respect, bear poor comparison with the European schools. To be ignorant of the natural import of the endings used in derivation, is to be unacquainted with the spirit and power of a language. Those who have but a partial view of the subject are very liable to fall into the errors, such as supposing that there is a difference of meaning in two endings, even where nothing but the form of the root determines the character of the ending. It

cannot be expected that this important subject will be well understood unless it be systematically taught. That it is not generally so taught, might, perhaps, be inferred from the deficiencies of most of our school books in regard to this whole subject.

As a perfect symmetry should be preserved in the course of study, it will be necessary for the teacher to arrange in his own mind a complete system of Latin philology. It will be well to begin with a view of that which would be proper for a mature scholar; and then to inquire what studies are naturally preparatory to it, and what are adapted to the capacities of the young, and favorable to the discipline of their powers. Afterwards, these last may be arranged, according to their connections and their relative importance, into a complete elementary course. Neither the tastes of the teacher nor the preferences of his class should be allowed to produce disproportion in the studies. But as it may not always be convenient to keep up an exact proportion in a series of instructions from the grammar, any correction may be easily applied in conducting the review of the reading lessons which have been committed to memory.

In nothing will the value of this mode of instruction be more apparent than in its influence

upon writing or speaking Latin. The specimens of Ciceronian Latin which are studied, will all be lodged permanently in the mind, as a basis of study and as models of the language. An early familiarity with a faultless Latinity will exclude corruptions even from contact with the young pupil's mind, and will, like pure seed, produce a good harvest. Latin composition will necessarily be corrupt, not only so long as our primary reading books are made up of modern Latin, but as long as students shall be required to write Latin without a model of Latinity in their minds. The earliest attempts should not be the composition of sentences, which must of necessity be *making* Latin, but easy, extemporaneous exercises on single words and subordinate clauses of these model sentences. We will illustrate our meaning from a very simple sentence, the first of chapter VIII. Omnia, quae pulchra, honesta, praeclara sunt, plena gaudiorum sunt. The pupil might be requested to convert this into a negative sentence, and be instructed, in regard to the position of *non*, and referred to chapter II, 4, and other passages for classic usage. Then the words *honesta* and *praeclara* might be dropped, and a clause beginning with *sed*, as corresponding to *non*, might be introduced, " not every thing which is beautiful, but —" and reference made

to the same passage as before. Another word could be substituted for *gaudiorum*, or another adjective for *plena* with the corresponding case, if it required a different case. *Omnia quae* could be changed into *omnes qui*, and other adjectives required, suited to the new subject, and agreeing with it in gender. The first exercises of the kind ought to be simple, and the variation supported in each case by classic examples. The chief benefit of such a practice is, that the framework of the sentence to be varied would preserve a student from gross Anglicisms in construction. He could never be guilty of such a blunder as to commence the sentence with the construction *omnia, quae sunt pulchra*, or terminate it with *sunt plena gaudiorum.*

Without such a classical basis, at the very outset, the first impressions must be erroneous, and the first specimens corrupting. It is as unphilosophical to begin with bad Latin in order to learn to write good Latin, as it is to begin with false spelling in order to learn to spell correctly. That which is false or corrupt ought not ever to be seen or heard by the young pupil. If, at the very beginning, he can be placed, as it were, within the language, and work upon it from an interior position, if his familiarity with classic passages will enable him to call many to

mind, and his first essays in using and combining words shall be guarded by being kept within the outline of a Ciceronian sentence, he will come directly under an influence purely Roman.

If the view here presented be correct, it will follow that a certain practice, which has sometimes been resorted to for the purpose of leading to a thorough study of the lesson, is dangerous. The practice alluded to is that of giving out first the English of the passage to be studied, and requiring the translation of it into Latin in order that it may be compared with the original, which is then to be closely examined. There is a better way of securing thoroughness. Certainly it is a mistake to pre-occupy the mind with barbarous Latin, merely for the sake of dislodging it again. It will be far safer to have both the understanding and the memory pre-occupied with the pure original, so that ultimately when a thought is entertained, it will of itself suggest the appropriate expression. It will be time enough for a pupil to construct independent sentences, when he shall have so imbibed the spirit of the language as to know the difference between a correct and an incorrect sentence. Not that one must learn to swim before he goes into water, but that he must, at first, be under direction and be kept out of too deep waters.

The variation of sentences, by substituting other words, and other clauses, ought, after a little progress has been made in the First Course, to be connected with nearly all the exercises. These first essays to acquire a command of the language, should always be under the immediate direction of the teacher. The exercises should be conversational, so that he may participate with his pupils, suggest to them the particular alterations to be attempted, and guard them against corruptions. Nothing tends more to enliven an ordinary recitation than the skilful interspersing of questions and remarks in relation to the different words and constructions that might be used in the sentence under examination. Sometimes an infinitive with its clause may be introduced in the place of a nominative, or if it happen to be already in the sentence, a noun may be required in its place. At another time, if occasion offers, a clause, beginning in English with the conjunction *that*, may be formed by an accusative with an infinitive, then by *ut* with the subjunctive, and finally by *quod* with the indicative, and the difference in these constructions pointed out. So when the idea of necessity or obligation occurs in a sentence, the various ways of conveying that idea in Latin may be represented, such as the gerund in *dum*,

the future passive participle, *opportet, necesse est, opus est, debet, non potest fieri quin,* and their various meanings explained. When exercises of this kind have been continued a long time, and varied so as to include most of the ordinary Latin constructions, a beginning may be made in forming easy original sentences, or in translating short passages from the English. The subjects, and all the ideas involved in them, should, at first, be such as were well known to the ancients. Every thing peculiar to modern times should be excluded from these exercises. A course of instruction in syntax will now be needed, which shall not merely enable the student to understand a Roman author, but also to construct Latin sentences. Krebs' Guide for Writing Latin, translated by Mr. Taylor, should for this purpose be made a companion to the Ciceronian.

NOTES.—PROCESS OF TEACHING.

I. INTRODUCTORY EXERCISES.

1. First find the subject or nominative and the verb. If *amicitiæ* is the nominative, it can be only in the plural. We infer that it is the subject, because no other construction will give any sense; and that it is the nominative plural, because neither the genitive or dative singular nor the vocative plural can be the subject or agent of the verb, and those are the only other cases of the word that end in *æ*. In order to ascertain the different relations expressed by the cases, notice the use of those cases in other passages. The teacher will give the necessary explanations where passages are referred to, which have not yet come before the student. Chap. XI, 13, the same form occurs, but it expresses an entirely different relation, that of the genitive. In No. 16 of the same chapter, we find the same form again, but here it expresses a relation entirely different from both the others, that of the dative. In No. 15, there is a different form, expressing

the direct object of the verb. In No. 10, we have the same form as the nominative singular, but in a connection where it cannot be either the nominative or the vocative, and must consequently be the ablative. The endings themselves of the genitive and dative express relations for which the English ordinarily employ prepositions. The same remark may be made of the ablative in most instances where it is used without a preposition. See Andrews & Stoddard's Grammar, § 36 and 37, and Krebs' Guide for Writing Latin, p. 7. The subject determines the number, gender and case of all the qualifying words which agree with it. For example, *verae* might, as to its form, be either in the genitive or dative singular; but inasmuch as there is nothing for it to agree with in either of these cases, it must agree with *amicitiae*. The same might be said of *sempiternae*.—Let the word *amicitia* now be declined, and then written on a blackboard with the quantity of the final syllables marked. The general rule for the gender of nouns of this declension may next be given. The adjectives *verae* and *sempiternae* may be carried through all the cases and genders, if the declension of adjectives has been learned; if not, let them be declined and written out as though they were nouns of the first declension. Now—*amicitia*

——*est* may be written on the blackboard, and *verae* and *sempiternae* changed so as to correspond in number and case. Next let *amicitia* be varied and carried through all the cases in both numbers, and the two adjectives made to agree with it in each.—Verus signifies *true, real, genuine, proper.* Verum (*the truth is*), *indeed, however, but;* vero (originally the ablative of *verum*), *in truth, to be sure;* and vere, *truly,* as opposed to *falsely,* all come from the adjective *verus.* So also veritas, *the truth, reality, correctness.* Sempiternus, *everduring,* is derived from semper, *always.* Amicitia, *friendship, amity* (between nations), is derived from *amicus,* which, as an adjective, means *friendly,* and governs the dative; but it is more commonly used as a noun, signifying *a friend,* and taking after it a genitive.

2. The first lesson is supposed to be reviewed and fixed in the memory. The second declension of nouns and the corresponding forms of the adjective are also supposed to have been learned by this time from the grammar. Let the pupil write on the blackboard the terminations of masculine nouns of the second declension in both numbers in one column, with the quantity marked; at a little distance, on the right, let him place, in another parallel column, the terminations

of neuter nouns of the same declension; and, finally, let him place between them the terminations of the first declension. These may be repeated both ways, singly through all the cases in both numbers, and conjointly in the manner of adjectives, by being carried through the three genders, until they are made perfectly familiar. *Iracundus* and *iratus* (treated for the present as an adjective) may be carried first through each of the genders singly, and then through them all conjointly. It will now be convenient to recur to the first lesson, and to change *amicitiae* into all the other cases of the plural, and then into those of the singular, and to require the words *verae* and *sempiternae* to be varied accordingly. The noun *dominus* may be substituted for *amicitiae*, and carried through all its variations, accompanied with the two adjectives, varied in the same way. The word *judicium* may next be used in like manner for representing the neuter gender. Iracundus means *passionate, irascible*, and is expressive of one's general character and temper, rather than of his feelings at any particular moment. When, as here, no particular person is meant, the noun with which the adjective agrees may be omitted. Iracundia means *passionate temper, irascibility;* whereas, iratus means *angry, in a fit of*

passion, and ira, *a burst of passion*, as something temporary. See Chap. XV, 11. Cundus is the termination of a class of verbal adjectives, and indicates *permanent qualities;* bundus is that of another class of verbal adjectives, and denotes a *transient state* (generally of excited passion).

3. With the review of the first two lessons may be connected a general view of the verb *sum*. *Iratus est* and *nati sumus* may still be treated as participles with the verb *sum*. This third sentence should be preceded by the study of two or three forms of the third declension, one of them being a feminine which increases in the genitive, another being a neuter also increasing in the genitive. The word *decus* may be declined and written on a blackboard, with the quantity marked as usual. It should then be compared with a masculine or feminine noun ending in *or*, genitive *ōris*, and the rules for the quantity of the penult settled. The fact, also, that there is a peculiarity in the neuter in the nominative, accusative, and vocative, as differing from those of masculine and feminine nouns both in the second and third declensions, may be stated and explained. *Libertas* should be written down in the same way as *decus*. Ad means *to*, as opposed to ab, *from*, and includes the ideas of *motion towards a place*, *arrival at a place*, and *nearness to a place*.

These three ideas of space are applied to those of *time*, *number*, and figuratively to all subjects. Decus signifies *every thing which is an ornament or a grace* to a person or thing, when viewed in the light of *fitness* or *propriety*. The word could not be used of tawdry ornaments. It is derived from decet, *it is proper*, *becoming*. Libertas denotes *freedom from external restraint*. It may relate to a particular act; or to one's individual condition, as opposed to slavery; or to the political condition of a people. In connection with the review of the first three lessons, a summary view of the third declension may be given with reference to the root of the word, and its relation to the nominative. The root of nouns of this declension is always found by casting off the termination *is*, of the genitive. Thus, *decor* and *libertat* are the roots from the genitives *decor*-is and *libertat*-is. *S* is the more common ending added to the root to form the nominative, but it is limited to feminines and a few masculines. Neuters and most masculines omit the *s* altogether. Inasmuch as the annexing of *s* to the simple root often gives a harsh and abrupt form for the nominative, certain changes are made for the sake of euphony. If the root end in *d* or *t*, these letters are always dropped in the nominative. Thus the roots,

pecud, gland, quiet, ment, before taking *s* to form the nominative (*pecuds, glands, quiets, ments*), drop the *t* and *d*, and form *pecus, glans, quies, mens*. But these letters are always resumed in the oblique cases. When *r* is the final letter of the root, it is generally changed into *s*, and consequently the *s* of the nominative ending is omitted. These words frequently change the final vowel also. In neuters, if the vowel before *r* of the root be *e* or *o*, it is changed into *u* in the nominative; in feminines, and in some masculines, the vowel *e* before *r* in the root is changed into *i* in the nominative. Thus the two last letters of these roots are changed. *Honor, mor, jur, corpor, oner, gener, funer, pulver, ciner*, in becoming nominatives, do not add the nominative ending *s* (*honors, mors, jurs*, &c.), but change the *r* into *s*, as *honos, mos*, &c. The neuters change also the vowels *o* and *e* into *u*, as *corpus, onus, genus, funus*, for *corpors, oners, geners, funers*. The masculines or feminines change the vowel *e* into *i*, as *pulver* and *ciner*, which first become *pulves* and *cines*, and then *pulvis* and *cinis*. But all the original letters always return in the oblique cases. The *i* in final syllables, both in nouns and in other words, is often changed into *e*. So, especially, the nominatives in *ebs, eps, ex, en*, and several

in *es*, where *d* or *t* has been dropped; as *cœlebs*, *princeps*, *judex*, *carmen*, *praeses*, *miles*, from the roots, *cœlib*, *princip*, *judic* (*cs* goes into *x*), *carmin*, *praesid* (*d* dropped before *s*), *milit*, (*t* dropped). It will be observed, that all the nominatives in *x* form this letter from the union of a final *c* or *g* of the root with the nominative ending *s*. Thus, *lux* stands for *lucs*, and *grex* for *gregs*. *Nocts* drops the *t*, according to the general rule, and then *nocs* goes regularly into *nox*. FEMININE NOUNS.—It may be laid down as a general rule, that feminine nouns of the third declension are inflected by appending to the root the endings, Nom. *s*, Gen. *is*, Dat. *i*, Accus. *em*, Voc. *s*, Abl. *e*. The apparent deviations are explained by the preceding observations. *Urbs*, *plebs*, *hiems*, *stirps*, *daps*, illustrate the simple declension; *palus*, *libertas*, *ars*, *frons*, *virtus*, *pars*, &c., merely resume the *d* or *t* of the root; *vox*, *arx*, *nex*, and *lex* simply resolve *x* into *cs* or *gs;* others, as mentioned above, restore the *r*, and the vowels, *e*, *o*, and *i*, of the root. Then there are several feminines which have *is* or *es* as the nominative ending, instead of *s*. MASCULINE NOUNS.—Several masculines end like the feminines in *s*, *is*, and *es*. For those in *is*, see Gram. § 63. Words in *x* are considered as ending in *s*, the change being merely ortho-

graphic. *Most masculines reject the nominative ending, and employ the root for the nominative.* So *anser, error, sol, consul.* When the root of this declension, or of the second, ends with *r*, preceded by a consonant, the letter *e* is inserted in the nominative, for the sake of euphony; as *pater, liber,* for *patr, libr.* So, also, all nouns in *ter*, except *later*, and the names of the months in *ber.* Masculines in *s* for *r* (*mos, flos, mus*), have already been mentioned. Several drop *n* final in the nominative, as *leo, sermo, latro,* which are *leon, sermon, latron,* in the root, the full form of which, as well as of all other words, is generally retained in the modern languages. When the final *o* is short, it is often interchanged with short *i*, as *homĭnis, Apollĭnis,* for *homŏnis, Apollŏnis.* So, also, the feminines in *dŏ* and *gŏ*, with the genitive *dĭnis, gĭnis,* as *ordo, imago,* &c. NEUTER NOUNS.—*Most neuters reject the nominative ending, and employ the root for the nominative;* as *fulgur, calcar, marmor.* Those which change the *r* final in the root into *s*, and the vowels *e* and *o* into *u*, as well as those which change *in* into *en* (in *flumen, lumen, nomen, semen,* &c.), have been already described. Several neuters add *e* to the root to form the nominative; as *mare*, from *mar*, the root. Neuters, ending in *a*, derived from the Greek, all drop

the *t* final of the root, to form the nominative; as *poëma*, for *poëmat*, the root. The foregoing remarks, which are placed together for the sake of completeness, may be distributed by the teacher, and connected with different lessons and reviews.

4. Before proceeding to lesson fourth, the first three lessons may be reviewed, in connection with an examination of the personal pronouns, and further attention to the verb *sum*. *Optimus* may be treated, at present, as an ordinary adjective, without particular regard to comparison. The word *portus* should first of all be written with the inflections of the third declension, and then the endings of the fourth declension should be placed in a parallel column, thus:

N.	Portŭ*s*——ŭs	Portū*ēs*——ūs
G.	portū*īs*——ūs	portŭ*ŭm*——ŭŭm
D.	portū*ī*——ūī	portŭ*ĭbus*—ĭbŭs
A.	portŭ*ĕm*——ŭm	portŭ*ēs*——ūs
V.	portŭ*s*——ŭs	portū*ēs*——ūs
A.	portŭ*ĕ*——ū	portŭ*ĭbus*—ibŭs

Inasmuch as the root *portu* ends in a vowel, and the terminations mostly begin with a vowel, two vowels are brought together so as to render the utterance unpleasant. A contraction, there-

fore, takes place in most of the cases, the vowel of the root (*u*) being retained, and that of the ending being dropped. The dative and ablative plural have two forms, in ŭbŭs, and in ĭbŭs, the one retaining the vowel of the root, the other, that of the ending. The latter is the more common form. Thus the fourth declension is but a branch of the third, and is founded on the same principle of inflection. The same is true of the neuter gender. In the plural, only the dative and ablative are contracted; in the singular, the genitive, dative, and ablative are contracted. The nominative and the vocative are the pure root. The genitive is *ūs* contracted from ŭĭs; the dative, *ū* from ŭĭ; the ablative, *ū* from ŭĕ. Only in later writers and in vulgar usage is the genitive in *ū* the prevailing form. See Krebs' Antibarbarus, 3d ed., p. 22, and Freund's Wörterbuch, Vol. I, p. LXXXI of the Preface. Portus is a *harbor*, a *place of safety and repose*. XI, 11, XIII. 3. Mutatio means *the act of changing*, *change*, from muto, *to change*. Abstract nouns ending in *io*, formed from the supine of the verb by changing *um* into *io* (*mutatum*, *mutatio*), express the act indicated by the verb. Compare with these words, both in form and in signification, the English words, *mutation*, *transmute*, *commute*, *mutual*, *mutable*,

&c. Consilium nearly corresponds to the English word *counsel.*

5. After Nos. 3 and 4 have been reviewed in a separate exercise, let a pupil take a noun in *is* of the third declension, which has no increase in the genitive, *avis* for example, and write the terminations on the blackboard. In a parallel column, on the right, let him place the terminations of a neuter noun in *e* of the same declension, *mare*, for example. The adjective *levis* may now be declined after these two forms, and then compared with *mitis*, as declined in the Gram., § 109. The only difference will be in the ending of the ablative singular, masculine. As the same inflection answers for masculine and feminine nouns of the third declension, the masculine and feminine of adjectives of the third declension, being inflected in the same way, need but one form. Let the three nouns, *onus*, *beneficii*, and *gratia* be declined, and the adjective *levis* be made to agree with them in all the cases in both numbers. Lĕvis signifies *light*, as opposed to heavy; hence, *trifling*, *unimportant*, *slender*, *nimble*. Lēvis, *smooth*, is another word, and is sometimes written *laevis*. Levitas is the abstract of levis, and signifies *lightness*, *levity*, *insignificance*. Onus is *a burden carried by some one*. Onero means *to*

load, to burden; onerarius is applied to *that which carries burdens*, and, when joined to *navis*, means a *transport-vessel.* Onerata navis is a *laded vessel.* Compare the English word, *onerous*, from onerosus, *burdensome, oppressive.* Beneficium signifies a *kind act*, or *favor conferred.* It comes from the adjective beneficus, *beneficent*, which is derived from bene, *well*, and facio, *to do.* Beneficientia, *beneficence*, is the *quality* of one who is *beneficus.* Compare the English words, *benefice, benefit, beneficence, beneficent, beneficial, benefactor, benefaction, beneficiary.* Gratia means *agreeableness, favor with another, benefit conferred*, and *the sentiment of gratitude.* The plural, gratiae, is used for *acts* of gratitude, but not for the *sentiment.* Gratiam habere means *to feel thankful*—used in the plural (*gratias*), only when there are several persons;—gratias agere signifies *to express one's thanks*, and is always plural, because the *act* may be repeated, while the *sentiment* is one. The ablative, gratia (literally, *out of favor or regard to*), means *for the sake of*, as in (*exempli gratia.*)

The pupil should now attend to the conjugation of the regular verbs. Further specimens of the mode of instruction in these Introductory Exercises are regarded as unnecessary.

II. FIRST COURSE.

[The grammatical drilling will need to be kept up continually; but it may now be left to the teacher. The matter, too, which is here thrown together, must be distributed by him into several successive courses.]

CHAP. I. 1. *Instructos* and *ornatos* agree in meaning furnished, but differ in this respect, that the former denotes being furnished with something for *use*, the latter, more for *embellishment*. They are here used not so much for distinction as for emphasis and rhythm. This use of synonyms is very common with Cicero. See Chap. IX, 3, *defertur et datur;* IX, 10, *lucem splendoremque;* IX, 11, *nefas et impium.* This practice is explained by Cicero himself, Tusc. II, 20. *Nihil enim——signicem pluribus.* For the use of the ablative, in general, see Krebs' Guide, § 191. On the construction of the ablative (*virtutibus*) with certain participles, see also Krebs, § 544, and especially the note, twelve lines from the bottom. Perfect passive participles, when they do not express an action, but the result of an action as a permanent quality, become adjectives and are susceptible of comparison. XII, 10. This is the case with *instructos* and *ornatos* here. Sapiens means (originally, one who has taste, sense), *one who is intelligent, wise, a*

practical sage, and is distinguished from philosophus, *a speculative thinker*. It comes from sapio, *to taste, to perceive, to be wise*. Sapientia expresses the quality of one who is *sapiens*, namely, *knowledge, wisdom, practical philosophy*. Chap. II, 8, 10, 11. Bonus very nearly corresponds in signification with the English word *good*. Dico signifies *to say, to speak, to call, to pronounce*. It is more commonly used of *connected formal discourse*, whereas loquor, *to speak*, is more used of *familiar and free conversation*. Tum, *then*, relates to a past time, and corresponds to quum, *when*. XIV, 6. Second Course, I, 9. Tunc (from tum-ce), *then*, is more emphatic, and is opposed to nunc, *now*. From this meaning of *tum* is derived its consecutive use, *then, after that*. *Tum—tum*, referring to each other, mean, *at the same time, —and, both—and*.

2. Vir means *a man* by way of pre-eminence, as opposed to a woman, or child, or any thing puerile or unworthy of a man. Homo, on the contrary, means *any human being*. Virtus expresses *all the characteristics of vir, excellence, bravery, virtue*. See Chap. V, 12. That sentence, and the one before us, are highly instructive on the word *virtus*. Compare the various uses of the English word *virtue*, as "the virtue of nitre,"

"in virtue of," "the virtues." Praestans signifies *standing before*, and hence *excellent*. Second Course, I, 4. II, 3. It is derived from praesto, *to stand before, to have the precedence*, or *superiority*, to *excel;* and, as an active verb, *to make good, to maintain, to furnish, to exhibit*. Second Course, III, 6. Praestat signifies, *it is preferable*. For the genitive *praestantis viri*, see Krebs, § 131, 142. The adjective ending *osus* denotes an *abundance* of what is expressed by the primitive word, or an *inclination* to it. For further examples, see X, 3. Second Course, V, 9. XVIII, 11. and XXV, 3. Fructuosa means *productive of fruit, benefit;* laboriosa, *full of labor, laborious;* periculosa, *full of danger, dangerous*. Fructus, *fruit, enjoyment, benefit*, is used literally and figuratively like the English word *fruit*. See IX, 10. X, 2. Fruges means *all the productions of the soil*, and cannot be used figuratively like *fructus*. Second Course, XXVI, 17. Periculum is "the attempt, by which we obtain experience while we are thereby exposed to danger, the trial, the danger itself, the risk." (Ramshorn's Synonyms.) Second Course, XXI, 4. See on the nature of the dative case (*aliis, ipsi*) the admirable explanation of Krebs, § 162. Autem, *but, moreover*, is slightly adversative in its force, and

while it marks a distinction it serves as a particle of transition. It is generally the *second* (sometimes the third) word in its sentence or clause. See Introd. Exer., 16, 31. Chap. II, 10. V, 12. VII, 9. X, 2. Sed, *but*, stands at the head of its sentence or clause, and is generally a strong adversative referring to a foregoing negative, as II, 4. III, 13. IV, 4. V, 1, 9, 10. VI, 4. In other cases it is either corrective and restrictive, as "he was a great man, *but*," or it begins a sentence. Aut, *or*, conveys the idea that but one of the conditions can be fulfilled at the same time. See Introd. Exer., 12. III, 7, 10. V, 8. Vel, *or* (from *velle*), means, *or if you wish*, and is corrective of what had been said before (*or rather*), and hence comes to signify *even*, where there is a climax. It is used also of two things that are not *essentially* different, and is thereby distinguished from *aut*. V, 12. VI, 6, 7. Second Course, IV, 12, and VIII, 17, and also XVI, 12, where it occurs in its *intensive* sense. Where these two words seem to be interchanged there was probably a difference in the *conception* of the writer. Ipse (from *is* and *pse*) *he himself*, distinguishes the person from others by rendering him the *most prominent*. Ei could not be used for *ipsi* here, inasmuch as it would form no contrast with *aliis*. Illi would refer to *that person*

in distinction from *huic*, this person; hence neither of them would be appropriate here. Sibi would refer to the subject *quae*, i. e., to *virtus*, which would destroy the sense. Videtur is not extensively used impersonally, meaning, *it seems*. "I think, or it seems to me," is commonly expressed by *videor*, *we think*, or *it seems to us*, by *videmur*. Second Course, XXIV, 2. XXV, 12. Here also it is used personally, *virtus videtur*. Nor does the word imply that a thing is so in *appearance only;* it contains rather a *modest affirmation;* as, "it will be found so," "that appears to be the truth." See Hand's Lat. Stil., p. 160, and Kreb's Antibarbarus.

3. Vis means *physical force*, *natural power*, *violence*, and never like potentia, *power*, in the sense of *personal influence*, or like potestas, *vested power*, *rightful control*. Vis, therefore, is always an *active principle* or *energy*, from which its figurative uses can easily be inferred. III, 7, Second Course, II, 12, 13. III, 4. In such connections as Second Course, IV, 3, and XXVI, 20, (*vim marmoris*), it is employed rhetorically for *abundance*. Vires means the *powers*, *forces*, *energies* of a person, or thing, and can rarely be interchanged with *vis*. VII, 4. X, 3, 6. XV, 16. Magnus is the common word for *great, as opposed to small*. Ingens signifies

very large. E x c i t o, *to arouse by some decisive means*, is stronger than e x c i e o, *to stir up something that is at rest*, or than the English word *excite*. Its peculiar fitness, as applied to a mighty agent represented as asleep, is obvious. F o r t e, an adverb, was originally the ablative of f o r s, *chance, accident*, and hence means *perchance*. Notice the construction of this sentence. It is formed with regard both to emphasis and to rhythm. The first member might have been written, *in virtutibus magna vis est;* but not only would it be less sonorous to close with short and abrupt words, but it would be less emphatic. Cicero put the most expressive word, *magna*, in the most important place; and the next most expressive word, *virtutibus*, in the next most important place. Thus the reader receives his first impression from the one, and his last impression from the other. What would be the effect of saying *excita eas*, and placing these words at the end of the sentence?

4. *Honestum*, a neuter adjective, used substantively, is a characteristic Roman word. VI, 3, 4. While the Greeks viewed virtue under the aspect of beauty, — "the beautiful and the good," — as was natural to their character and taste, the grave Romans viewed it under the aspect of dignity and propriety.

The word honestum means, ***whatever is fit or becoming to a man***, and hence ***moral excellence in the abstract.*** Honestas signifies ***honorable deportment or character.*** Second Course, III, 3, and XXV, 9. ***Honor*** is quite a different word. The Romans use but a few neuter adjectives in the singular to express abstract ideas in this way. Bonum, ***the good***, distinguished from bonitas, ***goodness***, and verum, ***the true*** (or ***that which is true***, XIV, 4), as distinguished from veritas, ***truth***, are the most important. The neuter adjective frequently stands in the singular without a noun, to denote a thing in the most ***general*** and ***indefinite manner***, as ***omne***, in No. 11 of this chapter.—Etiam (***et*** and ***jam***) ***also, even, and yet, still***, serves to strengthen the assertion, or to introduce something more important. See No. 6. Hence etiamsi, ***even if***, allowing something important, or that the case is a strong one. Introd. Exer., 23. Second Course, II, 10. Quoque, on the contrary, means ***also***, in the sense of ***just so, in like manner***, the equality excluding the idea of climax. We see here that it is an error when some say that ***etiam si*** requires the subjunctive. It is not so much the particle as the idea of ***doubt*** or ***supposition*** that requires the subjunctive. Here the action (***cernimus***) is viewed as a definite matter of fact, and

the indicative is the proper mood. Alius is *another one, different from those or from that already mentioned.* XVI, 7. Alter means *one of the two* (or the *second* in counting). Ceteri signifies *all those not before mentioned.* Hence the current expression, *et cetera.* It can therefore rarely be used in the singular number. XI, 9, "other things," than friendship. *The others* is never expressed by *alii*, but by *ceteri.* The expression, "one did this and another that," must be rendered by *alius—aliud*, i. e., each different person performed a different thing. XI, 7. Second Course, II, 3. Alii—alii, *some—others*, and aliter—aliter, *one way—another way*, are used distributively, when they are thus repeated. Second Course, XIX, 8. XVI, 10.—Cerno, which originally signified *to separate, to sift*, generally means *to distinguish by sight*, or *close inspection;* hence *discern, discriminate, decide.* From this word are derived secerno, *to separate;* discerno, *to distinguish;* decerno, *to decide, decree, determine.* With these various words and their derivatives compare the English words, *secrete, secretion, secret; discern, discreet, discretion*, and *decree.* The irregularities in the conjugation of *cerno, sperno*, and *sterno* should be examined, and compared with those of *cresco, quiesco, suesco* (in compounds), *pasco,*

and *nosco.* V i d e o expresses the ordinary act of *seeing*, perceiving objects by the sense of sight, and hence of *observing mentally.* Its derivatives and compounds are numerous; as *visio, visibilis, invideo, prævideo, provideo, revidio.* The use of the passive v i d e o r, *to be seen, regarded, supposed, believed,* has already been explained. Its synonyms are *credo, puto, opinor,* &c. M o v e o signifies *to move from a place,* and then *to move or affect the heart.* The Latin and the English words very nearly correspond both in their literal and their figurative meanings. See Second Course, XXVI, 2. The abstract noun is m o t i o, *the act of moving, motion.* The verb *moveo* is compounded with prepositions still more extensively than *video.*—A t q u e (and *ac*), *and,* connect *congenial ideas,* or *things which are of the same kind,* or synonymous words. Introd. Exer., 12, No. 11 of this chapter. E t, *and,* connects *externally* all kinds of ideas. Introd. Exer., 3, 7, 10, 21, 25, 28, 31.—*Illi in quo. Illi* is the only right word here, meaning *that other person* in whom; *ei in quo* would mean either *that one* in whom (explanatory), or *any one* in whom. *In,* with the ablative, is always put after *inesse* by Cicero, and is the proper classic form. Except Sallust, only the later writers use *inesse* with the dative (*cui*).—The irregular conjuga-

tion of *facio, jacio, capio,* and *ago* should now be learned.

5. For the force of the termination, *bilis*, in *amabilis*, see Gram., § 129, 3. Most adjectives in *ilis* have no superlative. Where there are more than three syllables in the positive, the superlative in *issimus* occurs in only three or four instances in good writers. *Amabilissimus* occurs only once. See p. 156, No. 7. Of the seven superlatives of this class of adjectives in *limus, gracilis* is found but once, and *imbicilis* but three or four times, and never in Cicero or Cæsar. See Reisig's Vorlesungen, p. 170. *Is qui*, when *is* is in apposition with a preceding noun, is explanatory of that noun, and is equivalent to the expression, "I mean the one who." Indeed, *dico* is inserted, when the gender, number, or case of *is* is different from that of the noun. Grysar's Lat. Stil., p. 44. When there is no reference to a preceding noun, it is also generally explanatory; as, "he who," *i. e.* "that particular one who," if a *real* person or thing is meant. But it often indicates not real persons or things, but those which exist only in the *conception* of the speaker, and then is indefinite, and means, "any one who." Introd. Exer., 14, 28, 31. First Course, II, 11, (*eum cui*, and *is qui. Illum qui*, and *illequi*, in the same sentence,

mean, "that other person who," as distinguished from the first). See, especially, III, 6. If *is qui* is to be rendered emphatic, the two words are separated, and each placed at the head of its clause. IX, 13. XIII, 5. The strongest emphasis is produced by placing *qui* at the head of the first clause, and *is* at the head of the second. Introd. Exer., 29 (*quod—id*), First Course, I, 12. II, 1 (*cujus—ejus*), VI, 7. In sentences less emphatic, the *is* in the last clause may be omitted. So it is in the passage before us, *qui quam adeptus erit—(is) a nobis diligetur*. See, also, III, 12. It is also omitted in the first clause. V, 1. XI, 13. XIII, 2.——*Quam*. In Latin, a new sentence, or distinct member of a sentence may begin with a relative, even in an oblique case, whereas, in English, the adjective pronoun, *this*, or *these*, with *and*, would be employed. IV, 3 (*quae*), V, 12. VII, 8. Adipiscor signifies *to acquire*, or *gain by effort*. Nanciscor, *to obtain*, does not imply effort; the acquisition may be by chance. The former is compounded of ad and apiscor, *to pursue, to obtain*. In such compositions, the vowel *a*, in the first syllable of the principal word, if followed by a single consonant, is often changed into *i;* as *ago, abigo; jaceo, conjiceo*. Before two consonants, it is sometimes changed into *e;* as *damno, condemno; arceo, coërceo;*

raptus, abreptus; aptus, adeptus, as in the case before us. Diligo, *to love as the result of reflection, to respect*, and differing from amo, *to love with spontaneous feeling*, is derived from lego, *to select*. In composition, the vowel *e* in the first syllable is changed into *i* before single consonants, with the exception of *r* and *h;* as *teneo, contineo; rego, dirigo;* and (as exceptions) *sero, desero; fero, refero; veho, conveho.* For the sake of a connected view of the changes of letters in verbs, one or two more remarks may be added. *Ae* is changed into *i;* as *caedo, occido; aestimo, existimo; quaero, requiro.* When dissimilar consonants come together, the former commonly conforms to the latter. *D* and *t* before *s* go into *s;* as *grassus* for *gradsus, fissus* for *fidsus, sessum* for *sedsum, cessi* for *cedsi, passus*, for *patsus, fassus* for *fatsus, possum* for *potsum, quassi* for *quatsi.* *R* goes into *s* before *s* and before *t* (compare what was said on the interchange of *r* and *s* in nouns); as *gessi* for *gersi, ussi* for *ursi, gestum* for *gertum, ustum* for *urtum.* *Essem*, however, is for *esrem, vellem* for *velrem, mallem* for *malrem*, and *nollem* for *nolrem.* *G* goes into *c*, and *b* into *p* before *t* and *s;* as *lectus* for *legtus, rectus* for *regtus, auctus* for *augtus, scriptum* for *scribtum, sorptum* for *sorbtum; auxi* (*aucsi*) for *augsi, rexi* for *regsi,*

mean, "[illegible] *lapsus* for *labsus*.—*Ubicunque*. from the [illegible] *ubi*, *there*, are correlatives, like *qui* is to [illegible] *tum* and *quum*, *tum* and *quam*, are separ[illegible] *quotiens*, *toties* and *quoties*. *Que* clause. IX [illegible] *quis*, *unde*, *quando*, &c., gives sis is prod[illegible] generally a distributive meaning to first clause[illegible] as ubi, *where*; ubique, *every*- Introd. Ex[illegible] *one*; quisque, *each of those* II, 1 (*cujus*[illegible] *one*; unde, *whence*; undique, phatic, the i[illegible]; quando, *when*; quan- So it is in th[illegible] distributively). *Cunque* (i. *tus erit*—(*is*) [illegible] prefixing *cum* to *que* strength- It is also omit[illegible] the idea; as ubicunque, XIII, 2.—Q[illegible] all conceivable places); quidistinct membe[illegible] undecunque, *whencesoever* relative, even [illegible]cunque, *whenever* (collective- English, the a[illegible]ded to this and other adverbs with *and*, would [illegible]phasis to the expression; as, 12. VII, 8. A d[illegible] world." See Gram., § 212, *gain by effort*. N[illegible] particularly Krebs, § 161, imply effort; the [illegible]means *a race*, or a collection The former is compo[illegible] descent; natio, *a people to pursue, to obtain*[illegible]*ment*, irrespective of devowel *a*, in the fi[illegible]n for a fuller account. word, if followed by [illegible]lone expresses only changed into *i*; as c[illegible] the prepositio Before two consonant[illegible]use. S[illegible] into *e*; as *damno*, co[illegible]

e;



6*

scripsi for *scribsi*, *lapsus* for *labsus*.—*Ubicunque*. *Ubi*, *where*, and *ibi*, *there*, are correlatives, like *inde* and *unde*, *tum* and *quum*, *tam* and *quam*, *tantum* and *quantum*, *toties* and *quoties*. *Que* appended to *ubi*, *quis*, *unde*, *quando*, &c., gives a wider and generally a distributive meaning to those words; as ubi, *where;* ubique, *everywhere;* quis, *some one;* quisque, *each of those of which* quis *is one;* unde, *whence;* undique, *from all quarters;* quando, *when;* quandoque, *whenever*, (distributively). *Cunque* (i. e., *cum-que*), by prefixing *cum* to *que* strengthens and generalizes the idea; as ubicunque, *wherever* (*i. e.*, in all conceivable places); quicunque, *whoever;* undecunque, *whencesoever;* quandocunque, *whenever* (collectively). *Gentium*, added to this and other adverbs of place, gives emphasis to the expression; as, "wherever in the world." See Gram., § 212, Rem. 4, Note 2, and particularly Krebs, § 161, (2), Note. Gens means *a race*, or a collection of families of common descent; natio, *a people under the same government*, irrespective of descent. See Ramshorn for a fuller account. *A nobis*. The ablative alone expresses only instrumental cause; joined with the preposition *a*, it expresses efficient or voluntary cause. See Gram., 248. When the preposition is prefixed

to the name of an inanimate object, it is equivalent to personification, and gives a very different coloring to the representation. Krebs, § 211. See Introd. Exer., 12, First Course, I, 8. II, 10. III, 13. VI, 6. IX, 4, 7. In Chap. VII, 11, *ratione* is personified by *a*, as will be seen from the expressions, r a t i o n i *parent*, and c u i s u n t *subjecti*. In Chap. IX,6, the representation by *ratione* alone, is entirely different. In XI, 14, is another example of personification. This use of the preposition must not be confounded with that in which it merely expresses the *quarter* from which any thing comes, or is separated, as Introd. Exer., 31, First Course, II, 1 and 6 (in which last case *persons* are so viewed), III, 6. V, 12.

III. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

Chap. I, 6. *Hoc.* When an adjective or pronoun is used indefinitely, or refers to no particular word, it must always be in the neuter gender. So *utile* in No. 10, and *omne* in 11 (comp. *omnis* in the same), IV, 6. *Hoc*, *illud*, and *id* often refer to a following dependent clause, III, 8. —*Posita.* The Latins were much more graphic and definite in such expressions as "in an enemy," than the English are, and fixed the

connection of such words with its noun beyond all doubt, by adding *posita*. On the use of *pono*, see Krebs, p. 440, and I, 14. V, 11. IX, 15. XII, 4. —9. *Percipitur*. The pupil should be made familiar with the classic use of this word, and learn in what cases to apply it.—11. *Proprium* expresses possession, and is generally used with the possessive case, and even with possessive pronouns. The few instances in which Cicero uses it with the dative seems to be to avoid a harsh sound, or to express a relation rather than possession. It means either *acquired property*, or something *peculiar* and *characteristic*. In all other cases, the possessive pronouns should be used; as *mea manu*, not *propria manu*, my hand. "My own hand," when opposed to another's, may be expressed by *mea ipsius manu;* when opposed to what is common, by *mea propria manu*.

CHAP. II. 1. The construction of this sentence is peculiarly Latin. According to the genius of the language, the attention is kept up, by withholding the main assertion till the very close. *In pecunia*, by being included between *omnis* and *spes*, is guarded from ambiguity. *Cujus*, *ejus*, and *remotus* have each an emphatic place.—5. *Habitum* is not useless here. The meaning is not that "it always is the part of a

wise man," but that "it is always *regarded* as the part of a wise man." XV, 2. XVI, 5.—7. *Adhibita.* This is the ordinary word for the English, *applied,* and should early be made familiar in this sense. VII, 5, Second Course, VIII, 4. XVIII, 14. XXV, 7 and 8.—*Affectus.* XII, 2. For the peculiar use of *afficere*, see Krebs, § 205. —9. E x means *out of*, and relates to what is *internal*, or what comes from *within*. With *pendo* it is stronger than *ab*, which represents an outward dependence and a looser connection. XV, 2. See Reisig, Vorlesungen, p. 722.

CHAP. III. 8. T o t u s means *the whole*, as made up of cohesive parts, XIV, 3. O m n i s, *every one;* o m n e s, *all*, first with reference to *number*, and then *omnis*, the whole viewed as *divisible*, XIII, 7. XIV, 7.—9. Observe the difference between s i m u l a t i o, *false pretension;* and d i s s i m u l a t i o, *concealment.*—10. C a d i t, *it happens, it falls out*, a figurative sense, borrowed from casting a die, or casting lots. It is often mistranslated. For the use of the second person in *amittas*, see Krebs, § 218. Comp. V, 11, *discedas.*—11. *Quis, quisquam*, and *ullus*, are used like the English word *any*, as distinguished from *some.* They are indefinite, whereas a l i q u i s means *some one in particular.*—*Credi.* When intransitive verbs, or any verbs which, in

the active voice govern other cases than the accusative, are used in the passive, they must *always* be used impersonally. As only those nouns or pronouns which are governed in the accusative in the active voice can become the nominative in the passive, all other nouns and pronouns must be put in the *dative* in the passive voice. But in the English, the sense is given by rendering the dative like a nominative, as "he ought not to be believed." See Krebs, § 171.—12. *Nam* stands as the first word of a sentence (except when appended to interrogative pronouns), and gives a fuller *explanation* of the preceding statement, IX, 6. XI, 15.—*Enim* is the second word in a sentence (except when preceded by a preposition with its noun, or other words which cannot be separated), and gives the *reason* of the preceding statement, VII, 11. VIII, 5. IX, 7 (where it has the third place, *ab hoc enim*, comp. III, 14), X, 3. XI, 10, 17, and 18. —13. *Ex* represents the *cause*, as the *source*, *out of which* a thing proceeds.—*Tenduntur. Insidiae* is here represented as a net or snare *stretched out*, or prepared for one.—14. *Fides* is defined by Cicero, in Chap. III, 2. See, also, XI, 10 and 11. It means, also, *promise* or *pledge* given by one party, and *reliance* or *faith* exercised by the other. Fidem habeo, as we

see here, does not signify *to be true* or *faithful* (which is a corrupt modern usage), but *to believe one, to trust him.* With *per fidem* compare *perfidia, perfidy,* in the same sentence.

CHAP. IV. 2. For the datives, *honori multis* and *probro nemini,* see Gram., § 227, and Krebs, § 173. The verb *sum* is omitted in pointed sayings and proverbs, as in No. 3, and Introd. Exer., 13.—3. Sane, *certainly, to be sure, entirely so,* differs from certe, *certainly,* at least. The former is more *concessive,* the lattter more *affirmative*; the former implies the assent of others, the latter does not. I, 2, 9, 11.—*Quodam,* like the English, "a certain," "a sort of," softens a bold assertion, and relates less to the object than to the speaker's feelings of modesty. *Quasi* prefixed to it softens the expression still more. (VII, 9.) Hand's Lat. Stil., p. 440. So *quædam* in No. 8, and *quodam* in VI, 5.—5. *Facitque, ut, eos diligamus, effect that,* i. e., *induce.* See Krebs, § 541, d.

CHAP. V. 3. *Queunt. Queo* has a very limited use, and never occurs in Cæsar. It is more commonly found in negative or antithetic sentences.—6. *Spartiatae.* The Latins are very sparing in the use of genitives in the names of places, as qualifying nouns. The adjective form or something equivalent is almost invaria-

bly used, instead of such expressions as, the youths *of Sparta*, "the inhabitants *of Rome*." See Krebs, 80, (3).—11. *Fortitudines*. The plural of abstract nouns is used only when there are several occasions, or acts to which it may refer, VII, 8, 9.

CHAP. VII. *Justitiae partes sunt*. We might say here, *justitiae est*, but the representation would be different. The latter would express the *peculiar nature* or *characteristic* of justice; the former represents it under the figure of an actor *having a particular part to act*. The plural (*partes*) must always be employed in this construction.—4. *Id quod*. In such explanatory clauses, where the English use only the relative (*what*, or *which*), both the relative and its antecedent (*id quod*) must be used in Latin.—5. *Vivitur*. See Krebs, § 220. So, also, II, 10, *definitum est*, not a personal verb agreeing with *sapientia*, but impersonal, and therefore less *specific*. In many instances the impersonal passive, by being more general, is the milder and less offensive form of expression.—6. *Sciente*. A participle in the oblique cases, is often used in a generic sense for *any person* performing such an act. See Introd. Exer., 4, 16, First Course, II, 9. Adjectives are employed in a similar way, III, 12, 13. IV, 2.

SENTENCES FOR YOUNGER PUPILS.*

1. Longa oratio est.
2. Magnum opus est.
3. Est longum iter.
4. Balbus est æger.
5. Dolor brevis est.
6. Philosophi homines sunt.
7. Venales sunt horti.
8. Innumerabiles sunt mundi.
9. Terra mundi pars est.
10. Deus mundum ædificavit.
11. Servus meus aufugit.
12. Is est in provincia tua.
13. Culpa nostra est.
14. Stulti miseri sunt.
15. Sapiens semper beatus est.
16. Nemo nimium beatus est.
17. Cæcilia in sella sedebat.
18. Omnium rerum principia parva sunt.
19. Ille forem cubiculi clausit.
20. De successore meo mihil audivi.
21. In foveam belua incidit.
22. Exigua spes est reipublicæ.

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[1] Att. XII. 6.—[2] X. 6.—[3] XII. 18.—[4] XIII. 47.—[5] Fin. II. 28, 93.—[6] V. 29, 89.—[7] Att. XII. 21.—[8] Acad. II. 17, 55.—[9] N. D. I. 10.—[10] Tusc. I. 25.—[11, 12] Fam. XIII. 77.—[13] Att. XIV. 14.—[14] Fin. III. 18, 61.—[15] II. 32, 104.—[16] V. 27, 81.—[17] Fam. I. 46.—[18] Fin. V. 21, 58.—[19] Tusc. V. 20.—[20] Fam. II. 17.—[21] Phil. IV. 5.—[22] Fam. XII. 9.

* See the Preface, near the end.

23. Delectaverunt me epistolæ tuæ.
24. Quis docuit Epaminondam?
25. Magna spes est in exercitus tui viribus.
26. Nec ullum animal est sine sensu.
27. Sol circum terram volvitur.
28. Sunt exercitus boni, sed rudes.
29. Supra me Atticus accubuerat.
30. Tauri pro vitulis contra leones contendunt.
31. Curat deus homines, civitates, nationes, gentes.
32. Natura hominis ab reliquis animalibus differt.
33. Jucunda est memoria præteritorum malorum.
34. Excisa est arbor, non evulsa.
35. Infra lunam nihil est nisi mortale et caducum.
36. Democritus explicat cur ante lucem galli canunt.
37. Brutus heri venit in Tusculanum post septimam horam.
38. Nostri sunt amnes, nostri lacus.
39. Sanguis per venas in omne corpus diffunditur.
40. Cornibus tauri, apri dentibus, morsu leones se tutantur.
41. Stoici diviserunt naturam hominis in animum et corpus.

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[23] Att. IV. 11.—[24] N. D. Praef.—[25] Ad. Brut. I. 15.—[26] N. D. III. 13, 32.—[27] II. 40, 102.—[28] Ad. Brut. I. 9.—[29] Fam. IX. 26.—[30] Fin. III. 20, 66.—[31] N. D. III. 38.—[32] Off. I. 27.—[33] Fin. II. 32.—[34] Att. XV. 14.—[35] Som. Scip. 4.—[36] Div. II. 6.—[37] Att. XIII. 7.—[38] N. D. II. 60, 152.—[39] N. D. II. 55.—[40] II. 50.—[41] Fin. IV. 7.

INTRODUCTORY EXERCISES.

EASY SENTENCES ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

1. Veræ amicitiæ sempiternæ sunt.
2. Iracundus non semper iratus est.
3. Ad decus et ad libertatem nati sumus.
4. Optimus est portus pœnitenti mutatio consilii.
5. Leve est onus beneficii gratia.
6. Omnes immemorem beneficii oderunt.
7. Omnis actio vacare debet temeritate et negligentia.
8. Vita, mors, divitiæ, paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent.
9. Ignoratio futurorum malorum utilior est quam scientia.

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[1] Læl. 9, 32. — [2] Tusc. IV. 24, 54. — [3] Phil. III. 14, 36. — [4] XII. 2, 7. — [5] Planc. 32, 78. — [6] Off. II. 18, 63. — [7] I. 29, 101. — [8] II. 10, 37. — [9] Div. II. 9, 23.

10. Tacitæ magis et occultæ inimicitiæ timendæ sunt quam indictæ et apertæ.

11. Facilius est apta dissolvere quam dissipata connectere.

12. Indignum est a pari vinci aut superiore, indignius ab inferiore atque humiliore.

13. Quot homines, tot sententiæ: falli igitur possumus.

14. Plerumque creditur iis, qui experti sunt.

15. Ut imago est animi vultus, sic indices oculi.

16. Jacet corpus dormientis, ut mortui; viget autem et vivit animus.

17. Proxime et secundum deos homines hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt.

18. Communem totius generis hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus.

19. Incertum est, quam longa nostrum cujusque vita futura sit.

20. Breve tempus ætatis satis est longum ad bene honesteque vivendum.

21. Profecto nihil est aliud bene et beate vivere, nisi honeste et recte vivere.

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[10] Verr. II. 5, 71, 182. — [11] Or. 71, 235. — [12] Quint. 31, 95. — [13] Fin. I. 5, 15. — [14] Top. 19, 74. — [15] Or. 18, 60. [16] Div. I. 30, 63. — [17] Off. II. 3, 11. — [18] I. 41, 149. — [19] Verr. II. 1, 58, 153. — [20] Cato, 19, 70. — [21] Parad. I. 3, 15.

22. Nihil tam volucre quam maledictum: nihil facilius emittitur, nihil citius excipitur, nihil latius dissipatur. [22]

23. Omnia brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si magna sunt.

24. In præstantibus rebus magna sunt ea, quæ sunt optimis proxima.

25. Aliorum judicio permulta nobis et facienda et non facienda et mutanda et corrigenda sunt.

26. Ad quas res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus. [23]

27. Ea sunt animadvertenda peccata maxime, quæ difficillime præcaventur.

28. Egens æque est is, qui non satis habet, et is, cui nihil satis potest esse.

29. Male se res habet, quum, quod virtute effici debet, id tentatur pecunia.

30. O dii immortales! non intelligunt homines, quam magnum vectigal sit parsimonia.

31. Res familiaris quæri debet iis rebus, a quibus abest turpitudo; conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia; eisdem etiam rebus augeri.

32. Esse oportet, ut vivas, non vivere, ut edas.

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[22] Planc. 23, 57. — [23] Læl. 27, 104. — [24] Or. 2, 6. — [25] Off. I. 41, 147. — [26] I. 31, 114. — [27] Rosc. A. 40, 116. — [28] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [29] Off. II. 6, 22. — [30] Parad. VI. 2, 49. — [31] Off. II. 24, 87. — [32] Heren. IV. 28, 39.

FIRST COURSE.

Chap. I.

VIRTUE.

1. Omnibus virtutibus instructos et ornatos tum sapientes tum viros bonos dicimus.

2. Ea denique virtus esse videtur præstantis viri, quæ est fructuosa aliis, ipsi autem laboriosa aut periculosa, aut certe gratuita.

3. Magna vis est in virtutibus: eas excita, si forte dormiunt.

4. Honestum, etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos movet atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit.

5. Nihil est virtute amabilius; quam qui adeptus erit, ubicunque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur.

6. Habet hoc virtus, ut viros fortes species ejus et pulchritudo etiam in hoste posita delectet.

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[1] Tusc. V. 10, 28. —[2] De Or. II. 85, 346. —[3] Tusc. III. 17, 36. —[4] Off. I. 17, 55. —[5] N. D. I. 44, 121. —[6] Pis. 32, 81.

7. Ut improbo et stulto et inerti nemini bene esse potest, sic bonus vir et fortis et sapiens miser esse non potest.

8. Nec cuiquam bono mali quidquam evenire potest, nec vivo nec mortuo: nec unquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur.

9. Certe major est virtutis jucunditas quam ista voluptas, quæ percipitur ex libidine et cupiditate.

10. Nunquam est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe: et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile.

11. Si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatum est, idque virtutis est proprium: certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt.

12. Qui nihil habet in vita jucundius vita, is cum virtute vitam non potest colere.

13. Omnes bene vivendi rationes in virtute sunt collocandæ, propterea quod sola virtus in sua potestate est, omnia præter eam subjecta sunt sub fortunæ dominationem.

14. Contemnamus omnes ineptias, totamque vim bene vivendi in animi robore ac magnitudine

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[7] Parad. II. 19. — [8] Tusc. I. 41, 99. — [9] Verr. II. 1, 21, 57. — [10] Off. III. 15, 64. — [11] Tusc. V. 13, 39. — [12] Heren. IV. 14, 20. — [13] IV. 17, 24. — [14] Tusc. I. 40, 95.

et in omnium rerum humanarum contemptione ac despicientia et in omni virtute ponamus.

Chap. II.

WISDOM.

1. Cujus omnis in pecunia spes est, ejus a sapientia est animus remotus.

2. Nunquam temeritas cum sapientia commiscetur, nec ad consilium casus admittitur.

3. Cujusvis hominis est errare; nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare.

4. Non parum cognosse, sed in parum cognito stulte et diu perseverasse, turpe est; propterea quod alterum communi hominum infirmitati, alterum singulari uniuscujusque vitio est attributum.

5. Tempori cedere, id est, necessitati parere, semper sapientis est habitum.

6. Judicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam.

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[1] Heren. IV. 20, 28. — [2] Marcel. 2, 7. — [3] Phil. XII. 2, 5. — [4] Inv. II. 3, 9. — [5] Fam. IV. 9, 2. — [6] N. D. III. 36, 88.

7. Bene adhibita ratio cernit, quid optimum sit; neglecta multis implicatur erroribus.

8. Sapientis animus ita semper affectus est, ut ratione optime utatur. [7]

9. Quid turpius, quam sapientis vitam ex insipientium sermone pendere?

10. Quid est, per deos, optabilius sapientia? quid præstantius? quid homini melius? quid homine dignius? Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eæ res continentur, scientia.

11. Sapientissimum esse dicunt eum, cui, quod opus sit, ipsi veniat in mentem; proxime accedere illum, qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet. In stultitia contra est. Minus enim stultus est is, cui nihil in mentem venit, quam ille, qui, quod stulte alteri venit in mentem, comprobat.

Chap. III.

EQUITY AND TRUTH.

1. Accipere quam facere præstat injuriam.

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[7] Tusc. IV. 27, 58. — [8] III. 7, 15. — [9] Fin. II. 15, 50. — [10] Off. II. 2, 5. — [11] Cluent. 31, 84. — [1] Tusc. V. 19, 56.

2. Fundamentum justitiæ est fides, id est, dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.

3. Nihil honestum esse potest, quod justitia vacat.

4. Justitia sine prudentia multum poterit; sine justitia nihil valebit prudentia.

5. Boni nullo emolumento impelluntur in fraudem, improbi sæpe parvo.

6. Injustitiæ genera duo sunt: unum eorum, qui inferunt, alterum eorum, qui ab iis, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant injuriam.

7. Quum duobus modis, id est, aut vi aut fraude, fiat injuria; fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur: utrumque homine alienissimum; sed fraus odio digna majore.

8. Totius injustitiæ nulla capitalior quam eorum, qui, quum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.

9. Ex omni vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita nec, ut emat melius, nec ut vendat, quidquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus.

10. Cadit in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa, criminari, præripere, fallere?

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[2] Off. I. 7, 23. — [3] I. 19, 62. — [4] II. 9, 34. — [5] Mil. 12, 32. — [6] Off. I. 7, 23. — [7, 8] I. 13, 41. — [9] III. 15, 60. — [10] III. 20, 81.

Nihil profecto minus. Est ergo ulla res tanti, aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri boni et splendorem et nomen amittas?

11. Ubi semel quis pejeraverit, ei credi postea, etiam si per plures deos juret, non oportet.

12. Quid interest inter perjurum et mendacem? Qui mentiri solet, pejerare consuevit. Quem ego, ut mentiatur, inducere possum, ut pejeret, exorare facile potero. Nam, qui semel a veritate deflexit, hic non majore religione ad perjurium quam ad mendacium perduci consuevit.

13. Quæ pœna ab diis immortalibus perjuro, hæc eadem mendaci constituta est. Non enim ex pactione verborum, quibus jusjurandum comprehenditur, sed ex perfidia et malitia, per quam insidiæ tenduntur alicui, dii immortales hominibus irasci et succensere consueverunt.

14. Qui sæpenumero nos per fidem fefellerunt, eorum orationi fidem habere non debemus. Si quid enim perfidia illorum detrimenti acceperimus, nemo erit præter nosmet ipsos, quem jure accusare possimus. Ac primo quidem decipi, incommodum est; iterum, stultum; tertio, turpe.

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[11] Rab. Post. 13, 36. — [12, 13] Rosc. Com. 16, 46. — [14] Inv. I. 39, 71.

Chap. IV.

BENEVOLENCE.

1. Si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiæ conjunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit; ne agri quidem cultus permanebit.

2. Multum posse ad salutem alterius, honori multis; parum potuisse ad exitium, probro nemini unquam fuit.

3. Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium: quæ meminisse debet is, in quem collata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit.

4. Benevolentiam non adolescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia judicemus.

5. Quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur; tamen justitia et liberalitas id maxime efficit.

6. Habenda ratio est rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi sinere flagitiosum est; sed ita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiæque absit suspicio.

7. Nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut

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[1] Læl. 7, 23. — [2] Fragm. Orat. 4, 5. — [3] Læl. 20, 71. — [4] Off. I. 15, 47. — [5] I. 17, 56. — [6] II. 18, 64. — [7] II. 15, 55.

eam benignitas aperire non possit; nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus.

8. Si contentio quædam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus.

9. Videndum est primum, ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et ceteris; deinde, ne major benignitas sit quam facultates; tum, ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur.

Chap. V.

FORTITUDE.

1. Fortes et magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant injuriam.

2. Nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus.

3. Barbari quidam et immanes ferro decertare acerrime possunt, ægrotare viriliter non queunt.—Cimbri et Celtiberi in prœliis exsultant, lamentantur in morbo.

4. Contemnendæ res humanæ sunt; negli-

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[8] Off. I. 17, 58. — [9] I. 14, 42. —— [1] I. 19, 65. — [2] I. 19, 62. — [3] Tusc. II. 27, 65. — [4] IV. 23, 51.

genda mors est[5]; patibiles et dolores et labores putandi.

5. Ingemiscere nonnunquam viro concessum est, idque raro; ejulatus ne mulieri quidem.

6. Pueri Spartiatæ non ingemiscunt verberum dolore laniati.

7. Fortis et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis.

8. Quid est nequius aut turpius effeminato viro?

9. Quid est non miserius solum, sed fœdius etiam et deformius, quam ægritudine quis afflictus, debilitatus, jacens?

10. *Fortes* non modo *Fortuna adjuvat*, ut est in vetere proverbio, sed multo magis ratio, quæ quibusdam quasi præceptis confirmat vim fortitudinis.

11. Parvi sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi. — Sunt igitur domesticæ fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in quibus plus etiam quam in his operæ studiique ponendum est.

12. Appellata est ex viro virtus, viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo. Cujus munera duo sunt maxima, mortis dolorisque contemptio. Utendum est igitur his, si virtutis compotes, vel

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[5] Tusc. II. 23, 55. — [6] V. 27, 77. — [7] Off. I. 23, 80. — [8] Tusc. III. 17, 36. — [9] IV. 16, 35. — [10] II. 4, 11. — [11] Off. I. 22, 76, 78. — [12] Tusc. II. 18, 43.

potius si viri volumus esse; quoniam a viris virtus nomen est mutuata.

13. Et ea, quæ eximia plerisque et præclara videntur, parva ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique ducendum est; et ea, quæ videntur acerba, quæ multa et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturæ discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnæque constantiæ.

Chap. VI.

CIVILITY AND DECENCY.

1. Custos virtutum omnium dedecus fugiens laudemque maxime consequens verecundia est.

2. Justitiæ partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiæ non offendere: in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

3. Et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur.

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[13] Off. I. 20, 67. — [1] Part. Orat. 23, 79. — [2] Off. I. 28, 99. — [3] I. 36, 130.

4. Non pudendo, sed non faciendo id, quod non decet, impudentiæ nomen effugere debemus. Quem vero non pudet, hunc ego non reprehensione solum sed etiam pœna dignum puto.

5. Ut pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt: sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.

6. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paullum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet: sic videndum est in vita, ne forte quid discrepet; vel multo etiam magis, quo major et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.

7. Qui aut, tempus quid postulet, non videt, aut plura loquitur, aut se ostentat, aut eorum, quibuscum est, vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet, aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus aut multus est, is ineptus dicitur.

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[4] De Or. I. 26, 120.—[5] Off. I. 28, 98. — [6] I. 40, 145. — [7] De Or. II. 4, 17.

Chap. VII.

THE PASSIONS.

1. Omnes perturbationes animi morbos philosophi appellant.

2. Morbi perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis.

3. *Animus æger*, ut ait Ennius, *semper errat, neque pati neque perpeti potest; cupere nunquam desinit.*

4. Omnibus viribus, ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est.

5. Corporum adjumenta adhibentur extrinsecus, animorum salus inclusa in his ipsis est.

6. Animus perturbatus et incitatus nec cohibere se potest, nec, quo loco vult, insistere.

7. Cupiditates sunt insatiabiles: quæ non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt; totam etiam labefactant sæpe rem publicam.

8. Ex cupiditatibus odia, dissidia, discordiæ, seditiones, bella nascuntur. Nec hæ sese foris solum jactant, nec tantum in alios cæco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusæ

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[1] Tusc. III. 4, 9. — [2, 3] III. 3, 5. — [4] III. 3, 6. — [5] IV. 27, 58. — [6] IV. 18, 41. — [7, 8] Fin. I. 13, 43.

inter se dissident atque discordant. Ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici.

9. His autem perturbationibus, quas in vitam hominum stultitia quasi quasdam furias immittit atque incitat, omnibus viribus atque opibus repugnandum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitæ, tranquille placideque traducere.

10. Efficiendum est, ut appetitus rationi obediant eamque neque præcurrant, nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque tranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant.

11. Qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt. Relinquunt enim et abjiciunt obedientiam, nec rationi parent, cui sunt subjecti lege naturæ.

Chap. VIII.

PLEASURE.

1. Omnia, quæ pulchra, honesta, præclara sunt, plena gaudiorum sunt.

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[9] Tusc. III. 11, 25. — [10, 11] Off. I. 29, 102. —— [1] Tusc. V. 23, 67.

2. Omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est.

3. Tamquam bona valetudo jucundior est eis, qui e gravi morbo recreati sunt, quam qui nunquam ægro corpore fuerunt: sic omnia desiderata magis quam assidue percepta delectant.

4. Voluptates, blandissimæ dominæ, majoris partis animos a virtute detorquent.

5. Impedit enim consilium voluptas; rationi inimica est ac mentis, ut ita dicam, præstringit oculos, nec habet ullum cum virtute commercium.

6. Divine Plato escam malorum appellat voluptatem, quod ea videlicet homines capiantur, ut hamo pisces.

7. Si considerare volemus, quæ sit in natura hominis excellentia et dignitas, intelligemus, quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere; quamque honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie.

8. Victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem.

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[2] De Or. III. 25, 100.—[3] Quir. p. Red. 1, 4.—[4] Off. II. 10, 37.—[5] Cato, 12, 42.—[6] 13, 44.—[7] Off. I. 30, 106.—[8] I. 30, 106.

Chap. IX.

HONOR AND FAME.

1. Omnia sunt profecto laudanda, quæ conjuncta cum virtute sunt; et quæ cum vitiis, vituperanda.

2. Etsi nihil habet in se gloria, cur expetatur, tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur.

3. Is denique honos mihi videri solet, qui non propter spem futuri beneficii, sed propter magna merita claris viris defertur et datur.

4. Hæc est una via, mihi credite, et laudis et dignitatis et honoris: a bonis viris, sapientibus et bene a natura constitutis laudari et diligi.

5. Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur; ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nec simulatum potest quidquam esse diuturnum. — Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam volet, justitiæ fungatur officiis.

6. Omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda justitia est, quum ipsa per sese — nam aliter justitia non esset — tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriæ.

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[1] Part. Orat. 21, 71. — [2] Tusc. I. 45, 109. — [3] Fam. X. 10, 1. — [4] Sext. 65, 137. — [5] Off. II. 12, 43. — [6] II. 12, 42.

7. Duæ sunt artes, quæ possunt locare homines in amplissimo gradu dignitatis: una imperatoris, altera oratoris boni; ab hoc enim pacis ornamenta retinentur, ab illo belli pericula repelluntur.

8. Honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur ad studia gloria; jacentque ea semper, quæ apud quosque improbantur.

9. Nemo est tam agrestis, quem non, si ipsa minus honestas, contumelia tamen et dedecus magno opere moveat.

10. Ut levitatis est, inanem aucupari rumorem et omnes umbras etiam falsæ gloriæ consectari: sic levis est animi, lucem splendoremque fugientis, justam gloriam, qui est fructus veræ virtutis honestissimus, repudiare.

11. Optima hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio præstantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum: cui dedecori esse nefas et impium judicandum est.

12. Quorum autem prima ætas propter humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii, simulac juvenes esse cœperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere: quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non

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[7] Muren. 14, 30. — [8] Tusc. I. 2, 4. — [9] Part. Orat. 26, 92. — [10] Pis. 24, 57. — [11] Off. I. 33, 121. — [12] II. 13, 45.

modo non invidetur illi ætati, verum etiam favetur.

13. Is mihi videtur amplissimus, qui sua virtute in altiorem locum pervenit, non qui adscendit per alterius incommodum et calamitatem.

14. Hoc animo semper fui, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem.

15. Perge, ut agis, nomenque tuum commenda immortalitati; atque hæc omnia, quæ habent speciem gloriæ, collecta inanissimis splendoris insignibus, contemne; brevia, fugacia, caduca existima. Verum decus in virtute positum est.

Chap. X.

YOUTH AND AGE.

1. Temeritas est florentis ætatis, prudentia senescentis.

2. Ver tamquam adolescentiam significat ostenditque fructus futuros; reliqua tempora demetendis fructibus et percipiendis accommodata

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[13] Rosc. A. 30, 83. — [14] Cat. I. 12, 29. — [15] Fam. X. 12, 5. —— [1] Cato, 6. 20. — [2] 19, 70.

sunt. Fructus autem senectutis est ante partorum bonorum memoria et copia.

3. Defectio virium adolescentiæ vitiis efficitur sæpius, quam senectutis; libidinosa enim et intemperans adolescentia effetum corpus tradit senectuti.

4. Nihil est profecto homini prudentia dulcius; quam, ut cetera auferat, affert certe senectus.

5. Manent ingenia senibus, modo permaneat studium et industria.

6. Non viribus aut velocitatibus aut celeritate corporum res magnæ geruntur, sed consilio, auctoritate, sententia: quibus non modo non orbari, sed etiam augeri senectus solet.

7. Habet senectus, honorata præsertim, tantam auctoritatem, ut ea pluris sit, quam omnes adolescentiæ voluptates.

8. Ut adolescentibus bona indole præditis sapientes senes delectantur, leviorque fit eorum senectus, qui a juventute coluntur et diliguntur: sic adolescentes senum præceptis gaudent, quibus ad virtutum studia ducuntur.

9. Ut adolescentem, in quo senile aliquid, sic senem, in quo est aliquid adolescentis, probo; quod qui sequitur, corpore senex esse poterit, animo nunquam erit.

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[3] Cato, 9, 29. — [4] Tusc. I. 39, 94. — [5] Cato, 7, 22. — [6] 6, 17. — [7] 17, 61. — [8] 8, 26. — [9] 11, 38.

10. Cursus est certus ætatis et una via naturæ eàque simplex, suaque cuique parti ætatis tempestivitas est data; ut et infirmitas puerorum et ferocitas juvenum et gravitas jam constantis ætatis et senectutis maturitas naturale quiddam habeat, quod suo tempore percipi debeat.

11. Nemo est tam senex, qui se annum non putet posse vivere.

12. Resistendum senectuti est, ejusque vitia diligentia compensanda sunt. Pugnandum, tamquam contra morbum, sic contra senectutem. Habenda ratio valetudinis; utendum exercitationibus modicis; tantum cibi et potionis adhibendum, ut reficiantur vires, non opprimantur. Nec vero corpori soli subveniendum est, sed menti atque animo multo magis: nam hæc quoque, nisi tamquam lumini oleum instilles, extinguuntur senectute.

Chap. XI.

FRIENDSHIP.

1. Natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum annititur.

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[10] Cato, 10, 33.—[11] 7, 24.—[12] 11, 35.——[1] Læl. 23, 88.

2. Pares, vetere proverbio, cum paribus facillime congregantur.

3. Omnium societatum nulla præstantior est, nulla firmior, quam quum viri boni, moribus similes, sunt familiaritate conjuncti.

4. Vetus est lex illa justæ veræque amicitiæ, ut idem amici semper velint. Neque est ullum certius amicitiæ vinculum, quam consensus et societas consiliorum et voluntatum.

5. In quibus eadem studia sunt, eædem voluntates, in iis fit, ut æque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso; efficiturque id, quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus.

6. Et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

7. Non possumus omnia per nos agere: alius in alia est re magis utilis. Idcirco amicitiæ comparantur, ut commune commodum mutuis officiis gubernetur.

8. In Græcorum proverbio est: *Amicorum esse communia omnia.*

9. Ceteræ res, quæ expetuntur, opportunæ sunt singulæ rebus fere singulis: divitiæ, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudere; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas

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[2] Cato, 3, 7. — [3] Off. I. 17, 55. — [4] Planc. 2, 5. — [5] Off. I. 17, 56. — [6] Læl. 6, 22. — [7] Rosc. A. 38, 111. — [8] Off. I. 16, 51. — [9] Læl. 6, 22.

et munerĭbus fungare corporis. Amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, præsto est; nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiva, nunquam molesta est. Itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, pluribus locis utimur, quam amicitia.

10. Firmamentum stabilitatis constantiæque ejus, quam in amicitia quærimus, fides est. Nihil enim stabile est, quod infidum.

11. Ut locus sine portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse.

12. Nulla est hæc amicitia, quum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est.

13. Maximum ornamentum amicitiæ tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam.

14. Virtutum amicitia adjutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes.

15. Nulla est excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris: nam, quum conciliatrix amicitiæ virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris.

16. Quum in amicitia, quæ honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et fides anteponatur amicitiæ.

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[10] Læl. 18, 65. — [11] Inv. I. 30, 47. — [12] Læl. 26, 98. — [13] 22, 82. — [14] 22, 83. — [15] 12, 37. — [16] Off. III. 10, 46.

17. Neque contra rem publicam neque contra jus jurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet; ne si judex quidem erit de ipso amico. Ponit enim personam amici, quum induit judicis.

18. Veræ amicitiæ difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur. Ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo?

19. Qui fortunis alicujus inducti amicitiam ejus secuti sunt, hi, simul ac fortuna dilapsa est, devolant omnes. Quum enim recessit ea res, quæ fuit consuetudinis causa, nihil superest, quare possint in amicitia retineri.

20. Ut hirundines æstivo tempore præsto sunt, frigore pulsæ recedunt: ita falsi amici sereno vitæ tempore præsto sunt; simul atque hiemem fortunæ viderint, devolant omnes.

21. Verum illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiæ munus expletum sit.

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[17] Off. III. 10, 43. — [18] Læl. 17, 64. — [19] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [20] IV. 48, 61. — [21] Læl. 19, 67.

Chap. XII.

THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

1. Omnes antiquæ gentes regibus quondam paruerunt. Quod genus imperii primum ad homines justissimos et sapientissimos deferebatur.

2. Nimis liberum populum libertas ipsa servitute afficit.

3. Quæ harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia, artissimum atque optimum in omni re publica vinculum incolumitatis.

4. Mens et animus et concilium et sententia civitatis posita est in legibus. Ut corpora nostra sine mente, sic civitas sine lege, suis partibus, ut nervis ac sanguine et membris, uti non potest.

5. Circumspicite omnes rei publicæ partes: omnia legum imperio et præscripto fieri videbitis.

6. Legum ministri magistratus; legum interpretes judices; legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.

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[1] Leg. III. 2, 4. — [2] Resp. I. 44, 68. — [3] II. 42, 69. — [4] Cluent. 53, 146. — [5] 53, 147. — [6] 53, 146.

7. Magistratibus opus est, sine quorum prudentia ac diligentia esse civitas non potest.

8. Ut tutela, sic procuratio rei publicæ ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum, quibus commissa, gerenda est.

9. Talis est quæque res publica, qualis ejus aut natura aut voluntas, qui illam regit.

10. Omnibus rebus is, qui princeps in agendo est, ornatissimus et paratissimus esse debet.

11. Ut cupiditatibus principum et vitiis infici solet tota civitas, sic emendari et corrigi continentia. — Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes, (quamquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum exsistunt.

12. Judicis est semper in causis verum sequi; patroni nonnunquam veri simile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere.

Chap. XIII.

GOOD AND EVIL FORTUNE.

1. Non solum ipsa Fortuna cæca est, sed eos

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[7] Leg. III. 2, 5. — [8] Off. I. 25, 85. — [9] Resp. I. 31, 47. — [10] Cæcil. 15, 47. — [11] Leg. III. 13, 30; 14, 31. — [12] Off. II. 14, 51. — [1] Læl. 15, 54.

etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa est.

2. Sapienter cogitant, qui temporibus secundis casus adversos reformidant.

3. O fallacem hominum spem fragilemque fortunam et inanes nostras contentiones! quæ in medio spatio sæpe franguntur et corruunt, et ante, in ipso cursu, obruuntur, quam portum conspicere potuerunt.

4. Si quis spei non multum collocarit in casu, quid est, quod ei magno opere casus obesse possit?

5. Ei non multum potest obesse fortuna, qui sibi firmius in virtute, quam in casu, præsidium collocavit.

6. Magna illa laus et admirabilis videri solet, tulisse casus sapienter adversos, non fractum esse fortuna, retinuisse in rebus asperis dignitatem.

7. In rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magno opere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam, ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est; præclaraque est æquabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque frons.

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[2] Heren. IV. 17, 24.—[3] De Or. III. 2, 7.—[4, 5] Heren. IV. 19, 27.—[6] De Or. II. 85, 346.—[7] Off. I. 26, 90.

Chap. XIV.

DEATH.

1. Habes somnum imaginem mortis, eamque quotidie induis.

2. Quod omnibus necesse est, idne miserum esse uni potest?

3. Tota philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est.

4. A malis mors abducit, non a bonis, verum si quærimus.

5. Nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis perfectæ perfecto functus est munere.

6. Profecto mors tum æquissimo animo oppetitur, quum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest.

7. Turpis fuga mortis omni est morte pejor.

8. Qui id, quod vitari non potest, metuit, is vivere animo quieto nullo modo potest; sed qui, non modo quia necesse est mori, verum etiam quia nihil habet mors, quod sit horrendum, mortem non timet, magnum is sibi præsidium ad beatam vitam comparat.

9. Condiunt Ægyptii mortuos et eos servant

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[1] Tusc. I. 38, 92. — [2] I. 49, 119. — [3] I. 30, 74. — [4] I. 34, 83. — [5, 6] I. 45, 109. — [7] Phil. VIII. 10, 29. — [8] Tusc. II. 1, 2. — [9] I. 45, 108.

domi; Persæ etiam cera circumlitos condunt, ut quam maxime permaneant diuturna corpora. Magorum mos est, non humare corpora suorum, nisi a feris sint ante laniata.

Chap. XV.

PROPER DEPORTMENT.

1. Liber is est existimandus, qui nulli turpitudini servit.

2. Qui ex errore imperitæ multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus.

3. Optima vivendi ratio est eligenda; eam jucundam consuetudo reddet.

4. Suum quisque noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum judicem præbeat.

5. Sunt quidam homines non re, sed nomine.

6. Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum.

7. Multis simulationum involucris tegitur et quasi velis quibusdam obtenditur unius cujusque

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[1] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [2] Off. I. 19, 65. — [3] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [4] Off. I. 31, 114. — [5] I. 30, 105. — [6] Muren. 17, 36. — [7] Quint. Fr. I. 1, 5, 15.

natura: frons, oculi, vultus persæpe mentiuntur; oratio vero sæpissime.

8. Non, quantum quisque prosit, sed quanti quisque sit, ponderandum est.

9. Eorum nos magis miseret, qui nostram misericordiam non requirunt, quam qui illam efflagitant.

10. Nihil laudabilius, nihil magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia.

11. Prohibenda maxime est ira in puniendo. Nunquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad pœnam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quæ est inter nimium et parum.

12. Diligi et carum esse jucundum est propterea, quia tutiorem vitam et voluptatem efficit pleniorem.

13. Satis est, homines imprudentia lapsos non erigere; urgere vero jacentes, aut præcipitantes impellere, certe est inhumanum.

14. Sic vita hominum est, ut ad maleficium nemo conetur sine spe atque emolumento accedere.

15. Desinite dubitare, utrum sit utilius, propter multos improbos uni parcere, an unius

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[8] Brut. 73, 257. — [9] Mil. 34, 92. — [10] Off. I. 25, 88. — [11] I. 25, 89. — [12] Fin. I. 16, 53. — [13] Rab. Post. 1, 2. — [14] Rosc. A. 30, 84. — [15] Verr. II. 3, 89, 208.

improbi supplicio multorum improbitatem coërcere.

16. Nulla est tanta vis, quæ non ferro ac viribus debilitari frangique possit.

17. Nihil est opere et manu factum, quod aliquando non conficiat et consumat vetustas.

18. Quæ domus tam stabilis, quæ tam firma civitas est, quæ non odiis atque dissidiis funditus possit everti? ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, judicari potest.

Chap. XVI.

NARRATIVES.

1. Imperium Græciæ fuit penes Athenienses, Atheniensium potiti sunt Spartiatæ, Spartiatas superavere Thebani, Thebanos Macedones vicerunt, qui ad imperium Græciæ brevi tempore adjunxerunt Asiam bello subactam.

2. Duodequadraginta annos tyrannus Syracusanorum fuit Dionysius, quum quinque et viginti natus annos dominatum occupavisset.

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[16] Marcel. 3, 8. — [17] 4, 11. — [18] Læl. 7, 23. —— [1] Heren. IV. 25, 34. — [2] Tusc. V. 20, 57.

3. Dionysius tyrannus, Syracusis expulsus, Corinthi pueros docebat: usque eo imperio carere non poterat.

4. *Dionysius tyrannus** vivebat cum fugitivis, cum facinorosis, cum barbaris; neminem, qui aut libertate dignus esset, aut vellet omnino liber esse, sibi amicum arbitrabatur.

5. Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ, fidibus præclare cecinisse dicitur; Themistoclesque aliquot ante annis, quum in epulis recusaret lyram, est habitus indoctior.

6. Quartum jam annum regnante Lucio Tarquinio Superbo, Sybarim et Crotonem et in eas Italiæ partes Pythagoras venisse reperitur.

7. *Pythagoras,** quum Superbo regnante in Italiam venisset, tenuit magnam illam Græciam quum honore disciplinæ, tum etiam auctoritate; multaque secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur.

DEMARATUS.

8. Fuisse quendam ferunt Demaratum Corin-

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[3] Tusc. III. 12, 27. — [4] V. 22, 63. — [5] I. 2, 4. — [6] Resp. II. 15, 28. — [7] Tusc. I. 16, 38. — [8] Resp. II. 19, 34.

* The star affixed to a word in Italics indicates that the proper name or substantive is inserted in the place of the pronoun referring to it.

thium, et honore et auctoritate et fortunis facile civitatis suæ principem; qui quum Corinthiorum tyrannum Cypselum ferre non potuisset, fugisse cum magna pecunia dicitur, ac se contulisse Tarquinios in urbem Etruriæ florentissimam. Quumque audiret dominationem Cypseli confirmari, defugit patriam vir liber ac fortis, et adscitus est civis a Tarquiniensibus, atque in ea civitate domicilium et sedes collocavit. Ubi quum de matrefamilias Tarquiniensi duo filios procreavisset, omnibus eos artibus ad Græcorum disciplinam erudiit.

L. TARQUINIUS PRISCUS,

SON OF DEMARATUS.

9. *L. Tarquinius* * propter humanitatem atque doctrinam Anco regi familiaris est factus, usque eo, ut consiliorum omnium particeps et socius pæne regni putaretur. Erat in eo præterea summa comitas, summa in omnes cives opis, auxilii, defensionis, largiendi etiam benignitas. Itaque mortuo Marcio cunctis populi suffragiis rex est creatus L. Tarquinius: sic enim suum nomen ex Græco nomine inflexerat, ut in omni genere hujus populi consuetudinem videretur imitatus.

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* Resp. II. 20, 35.

L. TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS.

10. Illi injusto domino atque acerbo aliquamdiu in rebus gerundis prospere fortuna comitata est. Nam et omne Latium bello devicit, et Suessam Pometiam, urbem opulentam refertamque, cepit; et maxima auri argentique præda locupletatus votum patris Capitolii ædificatione persolvit, et colonias deduxit, et institutis eorum, a quibus ortus erat, dona magnifica, quasi libamenta prædarum, Delphos ad Apollinem misit.

Rex ille primum optimi regis cæde maculatus, integra mente non erat; et quum metueret ipse pœnam sceleris sui summam, metui se volebat. Deinde victoriis divitiisque subnixus exsultabat insolentia, neque suos mores regere poterat, neque suorum libidines.

Expulso Tarquinio tantum odium populum Romanum regalis nominis tenuit, quantum tenuerat post obitum vel potius excessum Romuli desiderium. Itaque ut tum carere rege, sic pulso Tarquinio nomen regis audire non poterat.

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[10] Resp. II. 24, 44; 25, 45; 30, 52.

SECOND COURSE.

Chap. I.

THE DEITY.

1. Nullum est animal præter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei.

2. Omnibus innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos.

3. Multi de diis prava sentiunt; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur: nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus: omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est.

4. Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum cælestium cogit confiteri.

5. Quid potest esse tam apertum tamque

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[1] Leg. I. 8, 24. — [2] N. D. II. 4, 12. — [3] Tusc. I. 13, 30. — [4] Div. II. 72, 148. — [5] N. D. II. 2, 4.

perspicuum, quum cælum suspeximus cælestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur? Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum seculis ætatibusque hominum inveterari potuisset.

6. Quis potest esse tam aversus a vero, tam præceps, tam mente captus, qui neget, hæc omnia, quæ videmus, deorum immortalium nutu atque potestate administrari?

7. Sit igitur hoc a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos, eaque, quæ gerantur, eorum geri judicio ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri, et, qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri, piorumque et impiorum habere rationem.

8. Cultus deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur.

9. Bene dictum est a Pythagora, doctissimo

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[6] Cat. III. 9, 21. — [7] Leg. II. 7, 15. — [8] N. D. II. 28, 71. — [9] Leg. II. 11, 26.

viro, tum maxime et pietatem et religionem versari in animis, quum rebus divinis operam daremus.

10. Deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas.

11. Donis impii ne placare audeant deos: Platonem audiant, qui vetat dubitare, qua sit mente futurus deus, quum vir nemo bonus ab improbo se donari velit.

12. Haud scio an, pietate adversus deos sublata, fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur.

13. Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domus.

Chap. II.

MAN.

1. Inanimum est omne, quod pulsu agitatur externo; quod autem animal est, id motu cietur interiore et suo.

2. Homines, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc

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[10] Off. II. 3, 11. — [11] Leg. II. 16, 41. — [12] N. D. I. 2, 4. — [13] Leg. II. 10, 26. — [1] Tusc. I. 23, 54. — [2] Fin. II. 14, 45.

uno a bestiis plurimum differunt, quod rationem habent a natura datam, mentemque et acrem et vigentem, celerrimeque multa simul agitantem, et, ut ita dicam, sagacem.

3. Ut bestiis aliud alii præcipui a natura datum est, quod suum quæque retinet, nec discedit ab eo; sic homini multo quiddam præstantius: etsi præstantia debent ea dici, quæ habent aliquam comparationem; humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum alio nullo, nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest.

4. *Cyrenaici* * non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem; sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intelligendum et ad agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum.

5. Quid interest, utrum ex homine se convertat quis in beluam, an in hominis figura immanitatem gerat beluæ?

6. Si nemo est, quin emori malit, quam converti in aliquam figuram bestiæ, quamvis hominis mentem sit habiturus; quanto est miserius, in hominis figura animo esse efferato? mihi quidem tanto videtur, quanto præstabilior est animus corpore.

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[3] Tusc. V. 13, 38. — [4] Fin. II. 13, 39. — [5] Off. III. 20, 82. — [6] Resp. IV. 1, 3, Fr.

7. Ut in corporibus magnæ dissimilitudines sunt — alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere; itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem — sic in animis exsistunt majores etiam varietates.

8. Ipsi animi, magni refert, quali in corpore locati sint. Multa enim e corpore exsistunt, quæ acuant mentem; multa, quæ obtundant.

9. Sæpe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus: ut facile intelligi possit, animum et videre et audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi.

10. Illud videto, ut deum noris, etsi ejus ignores et locum et faciem, sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere, etiam si ignores et locum et formam.

11. Mihi quidem, naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio multoque obscurior, qualis animus in corpore sit, tamquam alienæ domi, quam qualis, quum exierit et in liberum cælum quasi domum suam venerit.

12. Dicæarchus et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi, quid aut qualis esset, intelligentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt. Est illud quidem vel maximum, animo ipso animum videre: et nimirum hanc habet vim præ-

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[7] Off. I. 30, 107. — [8] Tusc. I. 33, 80. — [9] I. 20, 46. [10] I. 29, 70. — [11] I. 22, 51. — [12] I. 22, 51.

ceptum Apollinis, quo monet, ut se quisque noscat. Non enim, credo, id præcipit, ut membra nostra aut staturam figuramve noscamus. Neque nos corpora sumus; neque ego, tibi hæc dicens, corpori tuo dico. Quum igitur, *nosce te*, dicit, hoc dicit, *nosce animum tuum*. Nam corpus quidem quasi vas est aut aliquod animi receptaculum: ab animo tuo quidquid agitur, id agitur a te.

13. Quæro, quam vim habeat libra illa Critolai; qui quum in alteram lancem animi bona imponat, in alteram corporis et externa; tantum propendere illam lancem putet, ut terram et maria deprimat.

Chap. III.

CONSCIENCE.

1. Sapientibus conscientia ipsa factorum egregiorum amplissimum virtutis est præmium.

2. Mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo.

3. Illud est hominis magni atque sapientis,

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[12] Tusc. V. 17, 51. — [1] Resp. VI. 8, 17 — [2] Att. XII. 28, 3. — [3] Cluent. 58, 159.

maximi æstimare conscientiam mentis suæ, quam ab diis immortalibus accepimus, quæ a nobis divelli non potest: quæ si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis erit, sine ullo metu et summa cum honestate vivemus.

4. Magna vis est conscientiæ, et magna in utramque partem: ut neque timeant, qui nihil commiserint, et pœnam semper ante oculos versari putent, qui peccarint.

5. Si bene sentire recteque facere satis est ad bene beateque vivendum, vereor, ne eum, qui se optimorum consiliorum conscientia sustentare possit, miserum esse nefas sit dicere.

6. Simus igitur ea mente, quam ratio et veritas præscribit, ut nihil in vita nobis præstandum præter culpam putemus; eaque quum careamus, omnia humana placate et moderate feramus.

7. Nolite putare, ut in scena videtis, homines conscelerates impulsu deorum terreri Furiarum tædis ardentibus. Sua quemque fraus, suum facinus, suum scelus, sua audacia de sanitate ac mente deturbat. Hæ sunt impiorum furiæ, hæ flammæ, hæ faces.

8. Alexandrum regem videmus, qui quum

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[4] Mil. 23, 61. — [5], [6] Fam. VI. 1, 3, 4. — [7] Pis. 20, 46. [8] Tusc. IV. 37, 79.

interemisset Clitum, familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit : tanta vis fuit pœnitendi.

Chap. IV.

VIRTUE.

1. Nulla est laus, ibi esse integrum, ubi nemo est, qui aut possit aut conetur corrumpere.

2. Divitias sine divitum esse : tu virtutem præfer divitiis. Nam si voles divitias cum virtute comparare, vix satis idoneæ tibi videbuntur divitiæ, quæ virtutis pedisequæ sint.

3. Quis dubitet, quin in virtute divitiæ sint? quoniam nulla possessio, nulla vis auri et argenti, pluris quam virtus æstimanda est.

4. Nihil est amabilius virtute, nihil, quod magis alliciat ad diligendum ; quippe quum propter virtutem et probitatem eos etiam, quos nunquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus.

5. *Homines* * eos viros suspiciunt maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares perspicere

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[1] Verr. I. 16, 46. — [2] Heren. IV. 14, 20. — [3] Parad. VI. 2, 48. — [4] Læl. 8, 28. — [5] Off. II. 10, 36.

virtutes; despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant.

6. Admiratione afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et quum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere.

7. Negat Epicurus jucunde posse vivi, nisi cum virtute vivatur.

8. Socrates, quum esset ex eo quæsitum, Archelaum, Perdiccæ filium, qui tum fortunatissimus haberetur, nonne beatum putaret? Haud scio, inquit; nunquam enim cum eo collocutus sum. — Ain' tu? aliter id scire non potes? — Nullo modo. — Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit. — An ego possim, quum ignorem, quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus? — Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas? — Ita prorsus existimo; bonos beatos, improbos miseros. — Miser ergo Archelaus? — Certe, si injustus.

9. Plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio insequitur; deinde sermo atque fama; tum accusator; tum judex: multi etiam ipsi se indicaverunt. Quod si qui satis sibi contra

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[6] Off. II. 10, 37. — [7] Tusc. III. 20, 49. — [8] V. 12, 34. [9] Fin. I. 16, 50.

hominum conscientiam sæpti esse et muniti videntur, deorum tamen horrent, easque ipsas sollicitudines, quibus eorum animi noctes atque dies exeduntur, a diis immortalibus supplicii causa importari putant.

10. Ut nec medici nec imperatores nec oratores, quamvis artis præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum sine usu et exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officii conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem; sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat.

11. Satis nobis persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum.

12. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, æquitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas vel libido vel audacia, sintque magna constantia —; hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, ita etiam appellandos putemus.

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[10] Off. I. 18, 60. — [11] III. 8, 37. — [12] Læl. 5, 19.

Chap. V.

EQUITY AND TRUTH.

1. Meminerimus, etiam adversus infimos justitiam esse servandam.

2. Detrahere alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam,[1] quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quæ possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis.

3. Homo justus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detrahet.

4. *Justitiæ* * tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. — Quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent.

5. In rebus minoribus socium fallere turpissimum est. — Neque injuria, propterea quod auxilium sibi se putat adjunxisse, qui cum altero rem communicavit. Ad cujus igitur fidem

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[1] Off. I. 13, 41. — [2] III. 5, 21. — [3] III. 19, 75. — [4] II. 11, 40. — [5] Rosc. A. 40, 116.

confugiet, quum per ejus fidem læditur, cui se commiserit ?

6. In omni injustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quæ plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitate fiat injuria. Leviora enim sunt ea, quæ repentino aliquo motu accidunt, quam ea, quæ meditata et præparata inferuntur.

7. Illæ quidem injuriæ, quæ nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, sæpe a metu proficiscuntur, quum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet, ne, nisi id fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo.

8. Maxime adducuntur plerique, ut eos justitiæ capiat oblivio, quum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriæ cupiditatem inciderunt. Nam quidquid ejusmodi est, in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit servare sanctam societatem.

9. Si veritate amicitia, fide societas, pietate propinquitas colitur ; necesse est, iste, qui amicum, socium, affinem fama ac fortunis spoliare conatus est, vanum se et perfidiosum et impium esse fateatur.

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[6] Off. I. 8, 27. — [7] I. 7, 24. — [8] I. 8, 26. — [9] Quint. 6, 26.

10. Scite Chrysippus: "qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat: supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet. Sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est; alteri deripere jus non est."

11. Si sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem.

12. Ut, si unumquodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset: sic, si unusquisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est.

13. Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri, homini ad nullam rem utili? Minime vero.

14. Si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet vendere, indicetne ei vir bonus aurum

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[10] Off. III. 10, 42. — [11] III. 5, 21. — [12] III. 5, 22. — [13] III. 6, 29. — [14] III. 23, 92.

illud esse, an emat denario, quod sit mille denarium ?

15. Si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte latere uspiam, et velle aliquem imprudentem super eam assidere, cujus mors tibi emolumentum factura sit ; improbe feceris, nisi monueris, ne assideat.

16. Si is, qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriæ, reddasne depositum ? Non credo : facias enim contra rem publicam, quæ debet esse carissima.

17. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens ; reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere.

18. Sol Phaëthonti filio, (ut redeamus ad fabulas,) facturum se esse dixit, quidquid optasset. Optavit, ut in currum patris tolleretur. Sublatus' est. Atque is, antequam constitit, ictu fulminis deflagravit. Quanto melius fuerat in hoc promissum patris non esse servatum !

19. Quum rex Pyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset, quumque de imperio certamen esset cum rege generoso ac potente ; perfuga ab eo venit in castra Fabricii eique est pollicitus, si præmium sibi proposuisset, se, ut clam venisset, sic clam in Pyrrhi castra

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[15] Fin. II. 18, 59. — [16, 17] Off. III. 25, 95. — [18] III. 25, 94. — [19] III. 22, 86.

rediturum et eum veneno necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad Pyrrhum, idque ejus factum laudatum a senatu est.

20. Etiam, si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda: ut primo Punico bello Regulus captus a Pœnis, quum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset jurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu non censuit; deinde, quum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad supplicium redire maluit, quam fidem hosti datam fallere.

Chap. VI.

BENEVOLENCE.

1. Deinceps de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicendum est. Cujus est ratio duplex. Nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut pecunia.

2. Homines ad deos nulla re propius accedunt, quam salutem hominibus dando.

3. Quæ est melior in hominum genere na-

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[20] Off. I. 13, 39. — [1] II. 15, 52. — [2] Lig. 12, 38 — [3] Tusc. I. 14, 32.

tura, quam eorum, qui se natos ad homines juvandos, tutandos, conservandos arbitrantur?

4. *Res familiaris* [4] primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quæstu neque odioso; tum quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem præbeat.

5. Posse liberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio, nimirum is est pecuniæ fructus maximus.

6. Largitio, quæ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur. At qui opera, id est, virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, primum, quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adjutores habebunt; deinde consuetudine beneficentiæ paratiores erunt et tamquam exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum.

7. Grave est homini pudenti petere aliquid magnum ab eo, de quo se bene meritum putet; ne id, quod petat, exigere magis, quam rogare et in mercedis potius quam beneficii loco numerare videatur.

8. Videre licet, plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur, facere multa, quæ proficisci ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate videantur.

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[4] Off. I. 26, 92. — [5] II. 18, 64. — [6] II. 15, 52. — [7] Fam. II. 6, 1. — [8] Off. I. 14, 44.

Talis autem simulatio vanitati conjunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.

9. Danda opera est, ut iis beneficiis quam plurimos afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis posterisque prodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat.

10. Quum in hominibus juvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque vulgo loquuntur, se in beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio est. Sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causæ non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? A quo enim expeditior et celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior.

11. *Themistocles*,* quum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam collocaret: *Ego vero*, inquit, *malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam pecuniam, quæ viro.*

12. Et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed perniciosi assentatores judicandi sunt; et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios liberales sint, in eadem sunt injustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena convertant.

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* Off. II. 18, 63. — [10] II. 20, 69. — [11] II. 20, 71. — [12] I. 14, 42.

13. Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriæ, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur; hique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacunque ratione. Id autem tantum abest officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quæ prosit amicis, noceat nemini.

Chap. VII.

GRATITUDE.

1. Non is solum gratus debet esse, qui accepit beneficium, verum etiam is, cui potestas accipiendi fuit.

2. Quum duo genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi; demus necne, in nostra potestate est; non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine injuria.

3. Dissimilis est pecuniæ debitio et gratiæ. Nam qui pecuniam dissolvit, statim non habet id, quod reddidit; qui autem debet, æs retinet alie-

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[13] Off. I. 14, 43. —— [1] Prov. Cons. 17, 41. — [2] Off. I. 15, 48. — [3] Planc. 28, 68.

num; gratiam autem et qui refert, habet, et qui habet, in eo ipso, quod habet, refert.

4. Equidem nihil tam proprium hominis existimo, quam non modo beneficio, sed etiam benevolentiæ significatione alligari: nihil porro tam inhumanum, tam immane, tam ferum, quam committere ut beneficio, non dicam, indignus, sed victus esse videare.

5. Quum omnibus virtutibus me affectum esse cupio, tum nihil est, quod malim, quam me et gratum esse et videri. Hæc est enim una virtus non solum maxima, sed etiam mater virtutum omnium reliquarum.

6. Quid est pietas, nisi voluntas grata in parentes? qui sunt boni cives, qui belli, qui domi de patria bene merentes, nisi qui patriæ beneficia meminerunt? qui sancti, qui religionum colentes, nisi qui meritam diis immortalibus gratiam justis honoribus et memori mente persolvunt?

7. Quæ potest esse jucunditas vitæ, sublatis amicitiis? quæ porro amicitia potest esse inter ingratos?

8. Quis est nostrum liberaliter educatus, cui non educatores, cui non magistri sui atque doctores, cui non locus ipse mutus ille, ubi altus aut

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[4] Planc. 33, 81. — [5–8] 33, 80.

doctus est, cum grata recordatione in mente versetur ?

9. Cujus opes tantæ esse possunt, aut unquam fuerunt, quæ sine multorum amicorum officiis stare possint? quæ certe, sublata memoria et gratia, nulla exstare possunt.

10. Illud Hesiodium laudatur a doctis, quod eadem mensura reddere jubet, qua acceperis, aut etiam cumulatiore, si possis.

11. Si ea, quæ utenda acceperis, majore mensura, si modo possis, jubet reddere Hesiodus; quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? An imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia conferre; quales in eos esse debemus, qui jam profuerunt ?

12. In collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari: quod contra fit a plerisque. A quo enim plurimum sperant, etiam si is non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt.

13. Etiam gregarii milites faciunt inviti, ut coronam dent civi civicam, et se ab aliquo servatos esse fateantur; non quo turpe sit,

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[9] Planc. 33, 80. — [10] Brut. 4, 15. — [11] Off. I. 15, 48. — [12] I. 15, 49. — [13] Planc. 30, 72.

protectum in acie ex hostium manibus eripi, (nam id accidere nisi forti viro et pugnanti cominus non potest,) sed onus beneficii reformidant, quod permagnum est, alieno debere idem, quod parenti.

14. *Heraclitus*[14] universos ait Ephesios esse morte multandos, quod, quum civitate expellerent Hermodorum, ita locuti sint: "*Nemo de nobis unus excellat; sin quis exstiterit, alio in loco et apud alios sit.*" Quid? Aristides nonne ob eam causam expulsus est patria, quod præter modum justus esset? Quanti vero ista civitas æstimanda est, ex qua boni sapientesque pelluntur?

Chap. VIII.

FORTITUDE.

1. Constantem quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia prementem illum esse, quem magnanimum et fortem virum dicimus.

2. Nunquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles timidique videamur; sed

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[14] Tusc. V. 36, 105; 37, 109. — [1] IV. 28, 61. — [2] Off. I. 24, 83.

fugiendum etiam illud, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius.

3. In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est; subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis.

4. In adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter ægrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur.

5. Ea animi elatio, quæ cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si justitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est. Non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis.

6. Præclarum illud Platonis: "Non, inquit, solum scientia, quæ est remota ab justitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda; verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciæ potius nomen habeat, quam fortitudinis."

7. Proposita invidia, morte, pœna, qui nihilo segnius rem publicam defendit, is vir vere putandus est. Populi grati est, præmiis afficere bene

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[3, 4] Off. I. 24, 83. — [5] I. 19, 62. — [6] I. 19, 63. — [7] Mil. 30, 82.

meritos de re publica cives; viri fortis, ne suppliciis quidem moveri, ut fortiter fecisse pœniteat.

8. Inter omnes hoc constat, nec doctos homines solum, sed etiam indoctos, virorum esse fortium et magnanimorum et patientium et humana vincentium, toleranter dolorem pati; nec vero quisquam fuit, qui eum, qui ita pateretur, non laudandum putaret.

9. Gemitus si levationis aliquid afferret, tamen videremus, quid esset fortis et animosi viri: quum vero nihil imminuat doloris, cur frustra turpes esse volumus? Quid est enim fletu muliebri viro turpius?

10. Ad ferendum dolorem placide atque sedate plurimum proficit, toto pectore, ut dicitur, cogitare, quam id honestum sit. Sumus enim natura studiosissimi appetentissimique honestatis: cujus si quasi lumen aliquod adspexerimus, nihil est, quod, ut eo potiamur, non parati simus et ferre et perpeti.

11. Ex hoc cursu atque impetu animorum ad veram laudem atque honestatem illa pericula adeuntur in prœliis: non sentiunt viri fortes in acie vulnera; vel si sentiunt, se mori malunt, quam tantillum modo de dignitatis gradu demo-

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[8] Tusc. II. 18, 43. — [9] II. 24, 57. — [10, 11] II. 24, 58.

veri. Fulgentes gladios hostium videbant Decii, quum in aciem eorum irruebant. His levabat omnem vulnerum metum nobilitas mortis et gloria.

12. Leonidas, rex Lacedæmoniorum, se in Thermopylis trecentosque eos, quos eduxerat Sparta, quum esset proposita aut fuga turpis aut gloriosa mors, opposuit hostibus.

13. Fuit *Lacedæmoniorum* * gens fortis, dum Lycurgi leges vigebant. E quibus unus, quum Perses hostis in colloquio dixisset glorians, *Solem præ jaculorum multitudine et sagittarum non videbitis: In umbra igitur*, inquit, *pugnabimus.*

14. Qualis tandem Lacæna? quæ quum filium in prœlium misisset et interfectum audisset, *Id circo*, inquit, *genueram, ut esset, qui pro patria mortem non dubitaret occumbere.*

15. *Epaminondas* * quum vicisset Lacedæmonios apud Mantineam, atque ipse gravi vulnere exanimari se videret, ut primum dispexit, quæsivit, salvusne esset clypeus? Quum salvum esse flentes sui respondissent, rogavit, essentne fusi hostes? Quum id quoque, ut cupiebat, audivisset, evelli jussit eam, qua erat transfixus, hastam. Ita multo sanguine profuso, in lætitia et in victoria est mortuus.

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[12] Fin. II. 30, 97. — [13, 14] Tusc. I. 42, 101. — [15] Fin. II. 30, 97.

16. In primis meditemur illud, ut patientia dolorum in omni genere se æquabilem præbeat. Sæpe enim multi, qui aut propter victoriæ cupiditatem aut propter gloriæ, aut etiam, ut jus suum et libertatem tenerent, vulnera exceperunt fortiter et tulerunt, iidem omissa contentione dolorem morbi ferre non possunt.

17. Fortitudo est igitur affectio animi legi summæ in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans; vel conservatio stabilis judicii in eis rebus, quæ formidolosæ videntur, subeundis et repellendis.

Chap. IX.

CONTENTMENT.

1. Contentum suis rebus esse maximæ sunt certissimæque divitiæ.

2. Nihil est tam angusti animi tamque parvi, quam amare divitias; nihil honestius magnificentiusque, quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas; si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre.

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[16] Tusc. II. 27, 65. — [17] IV. 24, 53. —— [1] Parad. VI. 3, 51. — [2] Off. I. 20, 68.

3. Curio ad focum sedenti magnum auri pondus Samnites quum attulissent, repudiati sunt. Non enim aurum habere præclarum sibi videri dixit, sed eis, qui haberent aurum, imperare.

4. Ut stultitia, etsi adepta est, quod concupivit, nunquam se tamen satis consecutam putat: sic sapientia semper eo contenta est, quod adest, neque eam unquam sui pœnitet.

5. Quotidie nos ipsa natura admonet, quam paucis, quam parvis rebus egeat, quam vilibus.

6. Socrates, in pompa quum magna vis auri argentique ferretur, *Quam multa non desidero*, inquit.

7. *Scythæ Anacharsis* * epistola fertur his verbis: "*Anacharsis Hannoni salutem. Mihi amictui est Scythicum tegimen; calciamentum solorum callum; cubile terra; pulpamentum fames; lacte, caseo, carne vescor.*"

8. Civitates quædam universæ, more doctæ, parsimonia delectantur. — Persarum a Xenophonte victus exponitur: quos negat ad panem adhibere quidquam præter nasturtium.

9. Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco nu-

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[3] Cato, 16, 55. — [4] Tusc. V. 18, 54. — [5] V. 35, 102. — [6] V. 32, 91. — [7] V. 32, 90. — [8] V. 34, 99. — [9] Fin. II. 28, 90.

merat, audio dicentem, *cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim.*

10. Socratem ferunt, quum usque ad vesperum contentius ambularet, quæsitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse : se, quo melius cœnaret, opsonare ambulando famem.

11. Quid ? victum Lacedæmoniorum in philitiis nonne videmus ? Ubi quum tyrannus cœnavisset Dionysius, negavit, se jure illo nigro, quod cœnæ caput erat, delectatum. Tum is, qui illa coxerat : " minime mirum ; condimenta enim defuerunt." — Quæ tandem ? inquit ille. — " Labor in venatu, sudor, cursus ad Eurotam, fames, sitis ; his enim rebus Lacedæmoniorum epulæ condiuntur."

12. Darius in fuga, quum aquam turbidam et cadaveribus inquinatam bibisset, negavit, unquam se bibisse jucundius : nunquam videlicet sitiens biberat. Nec esuriens Ptolemæus ederat : cui quum peragranti Ægyptum, comitibus non consecutis, cibarius in casa panis datus esset, nihil visum est illo pane jucundius.

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[10] Tusc. V. 34, 97. — [11] V. 34, 98. — [12] V. 34, 97.

Chap. X.

THE PASSIONS.

1. Quemadmodum temperantia sedat appetitiones, et efficit, ut eæ rectæ rationi pareant, conservatque considerata judicia mentis: sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat, conturbat, incitat.

2. Nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, quum *exisse ex potestate* dicimus eos, qui effrenati feruntur aut libidine aut iracundia. — Qui igitur exisse ex potestate dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non sunt in potestate mentis: cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est.

3. Distrahuntur in contrarias partes impotentium cupiditates. Quum huic obsecutus sis, illi est repugnandum.

4. Neque civitas in seditione beata esse potest, nec in discordia dominorum domus: quo minus animus a se ipse dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidæ voluptatis et liberæ potest; atque pugnantibus et contrariis studiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest.

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[1] Tusc. IV. 9, 22. — [2] III. 5, 11. — [3] V. 20, 60. — [4] Fin. I. 18, 58.

5. Quemadmodum oculus conturbatus non est probe affectus ad suum munus fungendum; sic conturbatus animus non est aptus ad exsequendum munus suum. Munus autem animi est, ratione bene uti.

6. Quis dubitarit, quin ægrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriæ cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni æstimetur ea res, ex qua animus ægrotat, oriantur?

7. Quum præcipitur, ut nobismet ipsis imperemus, hoc præcipitur, ut ratio coërceat temeritatem. Est in animis omnium fere natura molle quiddam, demissum, humile, enervatum quodammodo et languidum. Si nihil esset aliud, nihil esset homine deformius. Sed præsto est domina omnium et regina, ratio. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro.

8. Qui vero probari potest, ut sibi mederi animus non possit, quum ipsam medicinam corporis animus invenerit, quumque ad corporum sanationem multum ipsa corpora et natura valeat, nec omnes, qui curari se passi sunt, continuo etiam convalescant; animi autem, qui se sanari voluerint, præceptisque

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[5] Tusc. III. 7, 15.—[6] IV. 37, 79.—[7] II. 21, 47.—[8] III. 3, 5.

sapientium paruerint, sine ulla dubitatione sanentur ?

9. Ut maris tranquillitas intelligitur, nulla ne minima quidem aura fluctus commovente ; sic animi quietus et placatus status cernitur, quum perturbatio nulla est, qua moveri queat.

10. Iratos proprie dicimus exisse de potestate, id est, de consilio, de ratione, de mente ; horum enim potestas in totum animum esse debet. His aut subtrahendi sunt ei, in quos impetum conantur facere, dum se ipsi colligant : — quid est autem se ipsum colligere, nisi dissipatas animi partes rursum in suum locum cogere ? — aut rogandi orandique sunt, ut, si quam habent ulciscendi vim, differant in tempus aliud, dum defervescat ira. — Ex quo illud laudatur Archytæ : qui quum villico factus esset iratior, *Quo te modo*, inquit, *accepissem, nisi iratus essem !*

Chap. XI.

PLEASURE.

1. Cyrenaici omne bonum in voluptate po-

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[9] Tusc. V. 6, 16. — [10] IV. 36, 77. — [1] Off. III. 33, 116.

suerunt, virtutemque censuerunt ob eam rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis.

2. Si in ipso corpore multa voluptati præponenda sunt, ut vires, valetudo, velocitas, pulchritudo; quid tandem in animis censes? in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam cæleste et divinum putaverunt.

3. Difficile dictu est, quænam causa sit, cur ea, quæ maxime sensus nostros impellunt voluptate et specie prima acerrime commovent, ab iis celerrime fastidio quodam et satietate abalienemur.

4. Pertinet ad omnem officii quæstionem, semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat. Illæ nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu; hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit, videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur.

5. Si quis est paullo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecundiam. Ex quo intelligitur, corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis præstantia, eamque contemni

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[1] Fin. II. 34, 114. — [2] Or. III. 25, 98. — [3, 4] Off. I. 30, 105.

et rejici oportere; sin sit quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse ejus fruendæ modum.

6. Nunquam mehercule ego neque pecunias istorum, neque tecta magnifica, neque opes, neque imperia, neque eas, quibus maxime adstricti sunt, voluptates in bonis rebus aut expetendis esse duxi: quippe quum viderem, homines rebus his circumfluentes ea tamen desiderare maxime, quibus abundarent. Neque enim expletur unquam nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis; neque solum, ea qui habent, libidine augendi cruciantur, sed etiam amittendi metu.

7. Xerxes quidem, refertus omnibus præmiis donisque fortunæ, non equitatu, non pedestribus copiis, non navium multitudine, non infinito pondere auri contentus, præmium proposuit, qui invenisset novam voluptatem.

8. Qui ita frui volunt cupiditatibus, ut nulli propter eas dolores consequantur, et qui suum judicium retinent, ne voluptate victi faciant id, quod sentiunt non esse faciendum; hi voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur prætermittenda voluptate.

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[6] Parad. I. 1, 6. — [7] Tusc. V. 7, 20. — [8] Fin. I. 14, 48.

Chap. XII.

SUFFERING.

1. Ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur hominum conspiratione atque consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quæ non homini ab homine nascatur.

2. Omne malum nascens facile opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robustius.

3. Quid est, quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam quum est intellectum, nihil profici et frustra esse susceptum.

4. Nullus est dolor, quem non longinquitas temporis minuat ac molliat.

5. Sensim enim et pedetentim progrediens extenuatur dolor: non quo ipsa res immutari soleat aut possit; sed id, quod ratio debuerat, usus docet, minora esse ea, quæ sint visa majora.

6. Cyrenaici non omni malo ægritudinem effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. Est id quidem non mediocre ad ægritudinem augendam; videntur enim omnia repentina graviora.

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[1] Off. II. 5, 16. — [2] Phil. V. 11, 31. — [3] Tusc. III. 28, 66. — [4] Fam. IV. 5, 6. — [5] Tusc. III. 22, 54. — [6] III. 13, 28.

7. *Anaxagoram* * ferunt, nuntiata morte filii, dixisse, *sciebam me genuisse mortalem:* quæ vox declarat, iis esse hæc acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata.

8. Ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quæ mala putentur, sint improvisa graviora. Itaque, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et præparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia humana homini meditata.

Chap. XIII.

HONOR AND FAME.

1. *Gloria* * est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta vox bene judicantium de excellente virtute: ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago. Quæ quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est bonis viris repudianda.

2. Admiratione afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur et quum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii non facile possunt obsistere.

7, 8 Tusc. III. 14, 30. —— [1] III. 2, 3. — [2] Off. II. 10, 37.

3. Præclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset.

4. Quod si qui simulatione et inani ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone sed etiam vultu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant.

5. Pecuniam si cuipiam fortuna ademit, aut si alicujus eripuit injuria; tamen, dum existimatio est integra, facile consolatur honestas egestatem.

6. Trahimur omnes laudis studio, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur. Ipsi illi philosophi, etiam illis libellis, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum inscribunt: in eo ipso, in quo prædicationem nobilitatemque despiciunt, prædicari de se ac nominari volunt.

7. Nullam virtus aliam mercedem laborum periculorumque desiderat præter hanc laudis et gloriæ; qua quidem detracta, quid est, quod in hoc tam exiguo vitæ curriculo et tam brevi tantis nos in laboribus exerceamus?

8. Nemo unquam sine magna spe immortalitatis se pro patria offeret ad mortem. Licuit

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[3, 4] Off. II. 12, 43. — [5] Quint. 15, 49. — [6] Arch. 11, 26. — [7] 11, 28. — [8] Tusc. I. 15, 32.

esse otioso Themistocli, licuit Epaminondæ; sed nescio quo modo inhæret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum, idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et exsistit maxime et apparet facillime. Quo quidem dempto, quis tam esset demens, qui semper in laboribus et periculis viveret?

9. Par est omnes omnia experiri, qui res magnas et magno opere expetendas concupiverunt. Quod si quem aut natura sua aut illa præstantis ingenii vis forte deficiet, aut minus instructus erit magnarum artium disciplinis; teneat tamen eum cursum, quem poterit. Prima enim sequentem honestum est in secundis tertiisque consistere.

10. Noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset; quærentibusque respondebat, Miltiadis tropæis se e somno suscitari.

11. Quam multos scriptores rerum suarum magnus ille Alexander secum habuisse dicitur! Atque is tamen, quum in Sigeo ad Achillis tumulum adstitisset, *O fortunate*, inquit, *adolescens, qui tuæ virtutis Homerum præconem inveneris!* Et vere. Nam, nisi Ilias illa exstitisset, idem tumulus, qui corpus ejus contexerat, nomen etiam obruisset.

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[9] Or. 1, 4. — [10] Tusc. IV. 19, 44. — [11] Arch. 10, 24.

12. Leviculus sane Demosthenes, qui illo susurro delectari se dicebat aquam ferentis mulierculæ, ut mos in Græcia est, insusurrantisque alteri: *Hic est ille Demosthenes.* Quid hoc levius? At quantus orator! — *Veni Athenas,* inquit Democritus, *neque me quisquam agnovit.* Constantem hominem et gravem, qui glorietur, a gloria se abfuisse!

Chap. XIV.

THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS.

1. Negligere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed omnino dissoluti.

2. Nihil est tam molle, tam tenerum, tam aut fragile aut flexibile, quam voluntas erga nos sensusque civium: qui non modo improbitati irascuntur candidatorum, sed etiam in recte factis sæpe fastidiunt.

3. Miseros interdum cives optime de re publica meritos! in quibus homines non modo res

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[12] Tusc. V. 36, 104. — [1] Off. I. 28, 99. — [2] Mil. 16, 42. — [3] 23, 63.

præclarissimas obliviscuntur, sed etiam nefarias suspicantur.

4. Perinde ut opinio est de cujusque moribus, ita, quid ab eo factum et non factum sit, existimari potest.

5. Homines imperiti facilius, quod stulte dixeris, reprehendere, quam, quod sapienter tacueris, laudare possunt.

6. Hoc plerumque facimus, ut consilia eventis ponderemus et, cui bene quid processerit, multum illum providisse, cui secus, nihil sensisse dicamus.

7. Nihil est, quod minus ferendum sit, quam rationem ab altero vitæ reposcere eum, qui non possit suæ reddere.

8. Omnia, quæ vindicaris in altero, tibi ipsi vehementer fugienda sunt. Etenim non modo accusator, sed ne objurgator quidem ferendus est is, qui, quod in altero vitium reprehendit, in eo ipse deprehenditur.

9. Nam qui hoc sibi sumpsit, ut corrigat mores aliorum ac peccata reprehendat, quis huic ignoscat, si qua in re ipse ab religione officii declinarit?

10. Omnibus in rebus, quæ graviores majores-

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[4] Cluent. 25, 69. — [5] De Or. II. 74, 301. — [6] Rab. Post. 1, 1. — [7] Cæcil. 9, 27. — [8] Verr. II. 3, 2, 4. — [9] II. 3, 1, 2. — [10] Sull. 25, 69.

que sunt, quid quisque voluerit, cogitarit, admiserit, non ex crimine, sed ex moribus ejus, qui arguitur, est ponderandum. Neque enim potest quisquam nostrum subito fingi, neque cujusquam repente vita mutari aut natura converti.

Chap. XV.

YOUTH AND AGE.

1. Quoniam officia non eadem disparibus ætatibus tribuuntur, aliaque sunt juvenum, alia seniorum; aliquid etiam de hac distinctione dicendum est. Est igitur adolescentis majores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur. Ineuntis enim ætatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est.

2. Maxime autem hæc ætas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore patientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in civilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam, quum relaxare animos et dare se jucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, me-

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[1, 2] Off. I. 34, 122.

minerint verecundiæ : quod erit facilius, si in ejusmodi quidem rebus majores natu volent interesse.

3. Qui adolescentium peccatis ignosci putant oportere, falluntur, propterea quod ætas illa non est impedimento bonis studiis. At hi sapienter faciunt, qui adolescentes maxime castigant, ut, quibus virtutibus omnem vitam tueri possint, eas in ætate maturissima velint comparare.

4. Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi etiam augendæ videntur ; danda vero opera, ut et amicos et juventutem et maxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adjuvent.

5. Nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiæque dedat. Luxuria vero quum omni ætati turpis, tum senectuti fœdissima est. Sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accesserit, duplex malum est, quod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adolescentium impudentiorem intemperantiam.

6. Aptissima sunt arma senectutis artes exercitationesque virtutum : quæ in omni ætate

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[3] Heren. IV. 17, 25. — [4, 5] Off. I. 34, 123. — [6] Cato, 3, 9.

cultæ, quum diu multumque vixeris, mirificos efferunt fructus, non solum quia nunquam deserunt, ne extremo quidem tempore ætatis, verum etiam quia conscientia bene actæ vitæ multorumque bene factorum recordatio jucundissima est.

7. Cyrus apud Xenophontem eo sermone, quem moriens habuit, quum admodum senex esset, negat se unquam sensisse senectutem suam imbecilliorem factam, quam adolescentia fuisset.

8. Leontinus Gorgias centum et septem complevit annos, neque unquam in suo studio atque opere cessavit. Qui, quum ex eo quæreretur, cur tamdiu vellet esse in vita, *nihil habeo*, inquit, *quod accusem senectutem.* Præclarum responsum et docto homine dignum! Sua enim vitia insipientes et suam culpam in senectutem conferunt.

9. Dux ille Græciæ nusquam optat, ut Ajacis similes habeat decem, at ut Nestoris; quod si acciderit, non dubitat, quin brevi sit Troja peritura.

10. Lysandrum Lacedæmonium dicere aiunt solitum, Lacedæmonem esse honestissimum domicilium senectutis; nusquam enim tantum tribuitur ætati, nusquam est senectus honora-

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[7] Cato, 9, 30. — [8] 5, 13. — [9] 10, 31. — [10] 18, 63.

tior. Quin etiam memoriæ proditum est, quum Athenis ludis quidam in theatrum grandis natu venisset, in magno consessu locum nusquam ei datum a suis civibus; quum autem ad Lacedæmonios accessisset, qui, legati quum essent, certo in loco consederant, consurrexisse omnes et senem illum sessum recepisse. Quibus quum a cuncto consessu plausus esset multiplex datus, dixisse ex iis quendam: Athenienses scire, quæ recta essent, sed facere nolle.

Chap. XVI.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC PURSUITS.

1. In primis hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque quum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere, cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus.

2. Omnes artes, quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur.

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[1] Off. I. 4, 13.—[2] Arch. 1, 2.

3. Hæc studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solatium præbent, delectant domi, non impediunt foris, pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.

4. Quamobrem pergite, ut facitis, adolescentes, atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite, ut et vobis honori et amicis utilitati et rei publicæ emolumento esse possitis.

5. Ut ager, quamvis fertilis, sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest; sic sine doctrina animus: ita est utraque res sine altera debilis.

6. Subacto mihi ingenio opus est, ut agro non semel arato, sed novato et iterato, quo meliores fetus possit et grandiores edere. Subactio autem est usus, auditio, lectio, literæ.

7. Magni interest, quos quisque audiat quotidie domi, quibuscum loquatur a puero, quemadmodum patres, pædagogi, matres etiam loquantur.

8. Exercenda est etiam memoria, ediscendis ad verbum quam plurimis et nostris scriptis et alienis.

9. Caput autem est, quod minime facimus: (est enim magni laboris, quem plerique fugi-

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[3] Arch. 7, 16. — [4] De Or. I, 8, 34. — [5] Tusc. II. 5, 13. — [6] De Or. II. 30, 131. — [7] Brut. 58, 210. — [8] De Or. I. 34, 157. — [9] I. 33, 150.

mus :) quam plurimum scribere. Stilus optimus et præstantissimus dicendi effector ac magister.

10. Omnes artes aliter ab iis tractantur, qui eas ad usum transferunt ; aliter ab iis, qui ipsarum artium tractatu delectati nihil in vita sunt aliud acturi.

11. Videmus, ex eodem quasi ludo summorum in suo cujusque genere artificum et magistrorum exisse discipulos dissimiles inter se ac tamen laudandos ; quum ad cujusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur.

12. Cujus est vel maxime insigne illud exemplum, quod dicebat Isocrates, doctor singularis, se calcaribus in Ephoro, contra autem in Theopompo frenis uti solere. Alterum enim exsultantem verborum audacia reprimebat, alterum cunctantem et quasi verecundantem incitabat.

13. Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus ; ubi enim quid esset, quod disci posset, eo veniendum judicaverunt.

14. Cui non sunt auditæ Demosthenis vigiliæ ? qui dolere se aiebat, si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria.

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[10] De Or. III. 23, 86. — [11, 12] III. 9, 36. — [13, 14] Tusc. IV. 19, 44.

15. Multi naturæ vitium meditatione atque exercitatione sustulerunt: ut Demosthenem scribit Phalereus, quum RHO dicere nequiret, exercitatione fecisse, ut planissime diceret.

16. In *Demosthene* * tantum studium fuisse tantusque labor dicitur, ut primum impedimenta naturæ diligentia industriaque superaret; quumque ita balbus esset, ut ejus ipsius artis, cui studeret, primam literam non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius esse locutus putaretur; qui etiam, ut memoriæ proditum est, conjectis in os calculis, summa voce versus multos uno spiritu pronuntiare consuescebat, neque is consistens in loco, sed inambulans atque adscensu ingrediens arduo.

17. Erat in *M. Catone* * inexhausta aviditas legendi, nec satiari poterat; quippe qui ne reprehensionem quidem vulgi inanem reformidans, in ipsa curia soleret legere sæpe, dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ rei publicæ detrahens.

18. P. Scipionem, eum, qui primus Africacanus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit ejus fere æqualis, *nunquam se minus otiosum esse, quam quum otiosus, nec mi-*

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[15] Div. II. 46, 96. — [16] De Or. I. 61, 260. — [17] Fin. III. 2, 7. — [18] Off. III. 1, 1.

nus solum, quam quum solus esset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna! quæ declarat, illum et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui solitum.

Chap. XVII.

ELOQUENCE.

1. Quamquam omnis locutio oratio est, tamen unius oratoris locutio hoc proprio signata nomine est.

2. Quid eloquentia præstabilius vel admiratione audientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia ?

3. Nihil est tam incredibile, quod non dicendo fiat probabile ; nihil tam horrĭdum, tam incultum, quod non splendescat oratione et tamquam excolatur.

4. Ut in vita, sic in oratione nihil est difficilius, quam, quid deceat, videre.

5. Nonne satius est mutum esse, quam, quod nemo intelligat, dicere?

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[1] Or. 19, 64. — [2] Off. II. 19, 66. — [3] Parad. Procem. 3. — [4] Or. 21, 70. — [5] Phil. III. 9, 22.

6. Omnis† cura mea solet in hoc versari semper, si possim, ut boni aliquid efficiam dicendo; sin id minus, ut certe ne quid mali.

7. Semper oratorum eloquentiæ moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia. Omnes enim, qui probari volunt, voluntatem eorum, qui audiunt, intuentur; ad eamque et ad eorum arbitrium et nutum totos se fingunt et accommodant.

8. Volo† se efferat in adolescente fecunditas. Nam facilius sicut in vitibus revocantur ea, quæ sese nimium profuderunt, quam, si nihil valet materies, nova sarmenta cultura excitantur: ita volo esse in adolescente, unde aliquid amputem. Non enim potest in eo succus esse diuturnus, quod nimis celeriter est maturitatem assecutum.

9. Hoc uno præstamus vel maxime feris, quod colloquimur inter nos, et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus. Quamobrem quis hoc non jure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis præstent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat?

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[6] De Or. II. 75, 306. — [7] Or. 8, 24. — [8] De Or. II. 21, 88. — [9] I. 8, 32.

† Antonius is the speaker.

Chap. XVIII.

FRIENDSHIP.

1. Hoc præstat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiæ nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.

2. Quoniam res humanæ fragiles caducæque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt, quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata jucunditas.

3. Quis est, pro deum fidem atque hominum, qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur?

4. Solem e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt: qua nihil a diis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil jucundius.

5. Præclarum illud est, et, si quæris, rectum quoque et verum, ut eos, qui nobis carissimi esse debeant, æque ac nosmet ipsos amemus; ut vero plus, fieri nullo pacto potest. Ne optandum quidem est in amicitia, ut me ille plus, quam se; ego illum plus, quam me: perturbatio vitæ, si ita sit, atque officiorum omnium consequatur.

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[1] Læl. 5, 19. — [2] 27, 102. — [3] 15, 52. — [4] 13, 47. — [5] Tusc. III, 29, 73.

6. Ut benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam — neque enim beneficium feneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus — sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis ejus fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.

7. Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatis causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiæ tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum, quam amici amor ipse delectat; tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, jucundum, si cum studio est profectum.

8. Plerique neque in rebus humanis quidquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimun diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos.

9. Digni sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa, cur diligantur. Rarum genus! et quidem omnia præclara rara, nec quidquam difficilius, quam reperire, quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum.

10. Si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos nunquam vidimus, vel, quod majus est, in hoste etiam diligamus; quid mirum, si animi hominum moveantur, quum eorum, quibuscum

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[6] Læl. 9, 31. — [7] 14, 51. — [8, 9] 21, 79. — [10] 9, 29.

usu conjuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur?

11. Est boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, hæc duo tenere in amicitia: primum, ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est, quam fronte occultare sententiam: deinde, non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum.

12. Accedat huc suavitas quædam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiæ. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

13. Hæc lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda quum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur.

14. Hæc prima lex amicitiæ sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus; ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere.

[11] Læl. 18, 65. — [12] 18, 66. — [13] 12, 40. — [14] 13, 44.

Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitæ pareatur.

15. Scitum est illud Catonis, ut multa: *melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri, quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur: illos verum sæpe dicere, hos nunquam.*

Chap. XIX.

THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

1. Quum penes unum est omnium summa rerum, regem illum unum vocamus, et regnum ejus rei publicæ statum. Quum autem est penes delectos, tum illa civitas optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis, (sic enim appellant,) in qua in populo sunt omnia.

2. Si qui voluptatibus ducuntur, et se vitiorum illecebris et cupiditatum lenociniis dediderunt, missos faciant honores. ne attingant rem publicam; patiantur virorum fortium labore se otio suo perfrui.

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[15] Læl. 24, 90. —[1] Resp. I. 26, 42. —[2] Sext. 66, 138.

3. Qui autem bonam famam bonorum, quæ sola vere gloria nominari potest, expetunt, aliis otium quærere debent et voluptates, non sibi. Sudandum est his pro communibus commodis, adeundæ inimicitiæ, subeundæ sæpe pro re publica tempestates; cum multis audacibus, improbis, nonnunquam etiam potentibus, dimicandum.

4. Virtute gubernante rem publicam, quid potest esse præclarius? quum is, qui imperat aliis, servit ipse nulli cupiditati; quum, quas ad res cives instituit et vocat, eas omnes complexus est ipse, nec leges imponit populo, quibus ipse non pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem præfert suis civibus.

5. Et qui bene imperat, paruerit aliquando necesse est, et qui modeste paret, videtur, qui aliquando imperet, dignus esse. Itaque oportet et eum, qui paret, sperare, se aliquo tempore imperaturum; et illum, qui imperat, cogitare, brevi tempore sibi esse parendum.

6. Plato tum denique fore beatas res publicas putavit, si aut docti ac sapientes homines eas regere cœpissent, aut ii, qui regerent, omne suum studium in doctrina ac sapientia collocassent. Hanc conjunctionem videlicet potes-

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[3] Sext. 66, 138. — [4] Resp. I. 34, 52. — [5] Leg. III. 2, 5. — [6] Quint. Fr. I. 10, 29.

tatis ac sapientiæ saluti censuit civitatibus esse posse.

7. Frugi hominem dici, non multum habet laudis in rege : fortem, justum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem ; hæ sunt regiæ laudes ; illa privata est.

8. Ab hoc genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur, aberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur ; in primisque operam dabunt, ut juris et judiciorum æquitate suum quisque teneat, et neque tenuiores propter humilitatem circumveniantur, neque locupletibus ad sua vel tenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia; præterea, quibuscunque rebus vel belli vel domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris, vectigalibus.

9. Animo consulem esse oportet, consilio, fide, gravitate, vigilantia, cura, toto denique munere consulatus omni officio tuendo, maximeque, id quod vis nominis ipsa præscribit, rei publicæ consulendo.

10. Sit summa in jure dicundo severitas, dummodo ea ne varietur gratia, sed conservetur æquabilis.

11. Sic a majoribus nostris accepimus, præ-

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[7] Dejot. 9, 26. — [8] Off. II. 24, 85. — [9] Pis. 10, 23. — [10] Quint. Fr. I. 7, 20. — [11] Cæcil. 19, 61.

torem quæstori suo parentis loco esse oportere: nullam neque justiorem neque graviorem causam necessitudinis posse reperiri quam conjunctionem sortis, quam provinciæ, quam officii, quam publicam muneris societatem.

12. Omni Macedonum gaza, quæ fuit maxima, potitus est Paullus: tantum in ærarium pecuniæ invexit, ut unius imperatoris præda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil domum suam præter memoriam nominis sempiternam detulit. Imitatus patrem Africanus, nihilo locupletior Karthagine eversa.

13. Quod Apollo Pythius oraculum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedæmoniis, sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis prædixisse.

14. *Utinam*, inquit C. Pontius Samnis, *ad illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem natus, si quando Romani dona accipere cœpissent! non essem passus diutius eos imperare.*

15. Hæc ratio ac magnitudo animorum in majoribus nostris fuit, ut, quum in privatis rebus suisque sumptibus minimo contenti, tenuissimo cultu viverent, in imperio atque in publica dignitate omnia ad gloriam splendo-

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[12] Off. II. 22, 76. — [13] II. 22, 77. — [14] II. 21, 75. — [15] Flacc. 12, 28.

remque revocarent. Quæritur enim in re domestica continentiæ laus, in publica dignitatis.

16. Facile omnes patimur esse quam plurimos accusatores; quod innocens, si accusatus sit, absolvi potest; nocens, nisi accusatus fuerit, condemnari non potest. Utilius est autem absolvi innocentem, quam nocentem causam non dicere.

17. Maxime et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus, eoque major, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui potentis alicujus opibus circumveniri urgerique videatur.

18. In corpore si quid ejusmodi est, quod reliquo corpori noceat, id uri secarique patimur, ut membrum aliquod potius, quam totum corpus intereat: sic in rei publicæ corpore, ut totum salvum sit, quidquid est pestiferum, amputetur.

Chap. XX.

WAR AND PEACE.

1. Bellum ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quæsita videatur.

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[16] Rosc. A. 20, 56. — [17] Off. II. 14, 51. — [18] Phil. VIII. 5, 15. —— [1] Off. I. 23, 80.

2. Suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine injuria in pace vivatur; parta autem victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt.

3. Multi bella sæpe quæsiverunt propter gloriæ cupiditatem; atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et cupidi bellorum gerendorum.

4. Omnia sunt misera in bellis civilibus; sed miserius nihil quam ipsa victoria: quæ, etiam si ad meliores venit, tamen eos ipsos ferociores impotentioresque reddit; ut, etiam si natura tales non sint, necessitate esse cogantur: multa enim victori eorum arbitrio, per quos vicit, etiam invito facienda sunt.

5. Summa dignitas est in iis, qui militari laude antecellunt; omnia enim, quæ sunt in imperio et in statu civitatis, ab iis defendi et firmari putantur: summa etiam utilitas; siquidem eorum consilio et periculo quum re publica tum etiam nostris rebus perfrui possumus.

6. Non solum bellandi virtus in summo atque perfecto imperatore quærenda est; sed multæ sunt artes eximiæ, hujus administræ comites-

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[2] Off. I. 11, 35. — [3] I. 22, 74. — [4] Fam. IV. 9, 3. — [5] Muren. 11, 24. — [6] P. Leg. Man. 13, 36.

que virtutis. Ac primum quanta innocentia debent esse imperatores! quanta deinde omnibus in rebus temperantia! quanta fide! quanta facilitate! quanto ingenio! quanta humanitate!

7. Neque enim potest exercitum is continere imperator, qui se ipsum non continet, neque severus esse in judicando, qui alios in se severos esse judices non vult.

8. Solent hoc boni imperatores facere, quum prælium committunt, ut in eo loco, quo fugam hostium fore arbitrentur, milites collocent; in quos, si qui ex acie fugerint, de improviso incidant.

9. Statuerunt ita majores nostri, ut, si a multis esset flagitium rei militaris admissum, sortitione in quosdam animadverteretur; ut metus videlicet ad omnes, pœna ad paucos perveniret.

Chap. XXI.

PATRIOTISM.

1. Omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior, quam ea, quæ cum re publica est

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[7] P. Leg. Man. 13, 38. — [8] Rosc. A. 52, 151. — [9] Cluent. 46, 128. — [1] Off. I. 17, 57.

unicuique nostrum. Cari sùnt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

2. Qui ea, quæ nunquam cara ac jucunda duxit, animo æquo rei publicæ causa deserit, nullam benevolentiam insignem in rem publicam declarat; qui autem ea relinquit rei publicæ causa, a quibus cum summo dolore divellitur, ei patria cara est, cujus salutem caritati anteponit suorum.

3. Tanta caritas patriæ est, ut eam non sensu nostro, sed salute ipsius metiamur. Itaque non deterret sapientem mors, quæ propter incertos casus quotidie imminet, propter brevitatem vitæ nunquam longe potest abesse, quo minus in omne tempus rei publicæ suisque consulat.

4. Sapiens nullum pro re publica periculum vitabit; ideo quod sæpe fit, ut, quum pro re publica perire noluerit, necessario cum re publica pereat.

5. Uti contemnendus est, qui in navigando se quam navim mavult incolumem: ita vituperandus est, qui in rei publicæ discrimine suæ plus quam communi saluti consulit. Navi enim fracta, multi incolumes evaserunt; ex naufra-

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[2] P. Dom. ad Pont. 37, 98. — [3] Tusc. I. 37, 90. — [4, 5] Heren. IV. 44, 57.

gio patriæ salvus nemo potest enatare. Quod mihi bene videtur Decius intellexisse, qui se devovisse dicitur et pro legionibus in hostes immisisse medios: unde amisit vitam, at non perdidit.

6. Qui pro re publica vitam ediderunt, nunquam mehercule eos mortem potius quam immortalitatem assecutos putavi.

7. *Codrus*[*] se in medios immisit hostes veste famulari, ne posset agnosci, si esset ornatu regio; quod oraculum erat datum, si rex interfectus esset, victrices Athenas fore.

8. Si patriam prodere conabitur pater, silebitne filius? Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet, accusabit; minabitur etiam; ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriæ res spectabit, patriæ salutem anteponet saluti patris.

9. Amemus patriam, pareamus senatui, consulamus bonis; præsentes fructus negligamus, posteritatis gloriæ serviamus; id esse optimum putemus, quod erit rectissimum; speremus, quæ volumus, sed quod acciderit, feramus; cogitemus denique, corpus virorum fortium magnorumque hominum esse mortale, animi vero motus et virtutis gloriam sempiternam.

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[6] Planc. 37, 90. — [7] Tusc. I. 48, 116. — [8] Off. III. 23, 90. — [9] Sext. 68, 143.

Chap. XXII.

GOOD AND EVIL FORTUNE.

1. Errant, qui in prosperis rebus omnes impetus fortunæ se putant fugisse.

2. Nemo potest non beatissimus esse, qui est totus aptus ex sese, quique in se uno sua ponit omnia. Cui spes omnis et ratio et cogitatio pendet ex fortuna, huic nihil potest esse certi.

3. Ut quæstuosa mercatura, fructuosa aratio dicitur, non si altera semper omni damno, altera omni tempestatis calamitate semper vacat, sed si multo majore ex parte exstat in utraque felicitas: sic vita, non solum si undique referta bonis est, sed si multo majore et graviore ex parte bona propendent, beata recte dici potest.

4. Dies deficiat, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenerit, nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime.

5. Quidquid oritur, qualecunque est, causam habeat a natura necesse est; ut, etiam si præter consuetudinem exstiterit, præter naturam tamen non possit exsistere.

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[1] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [2] Parad. II. 17. — [3] Tusc. V. 31, 86. — [4] N. D. III. 32, 81. — [5] Div. II. 28, 60.

6. Causam igitur investigato in re nova atque admirabili, si poteris. Si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri potuisse sine causa; eumque terrorem, quem tibi rei novitas attulerit, naturæ ratione depellito.

7. Interitus exercituum, clades imperatorum, invidiæ præterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene meritorum sæpe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugæ: rursusque secundæ res, honores, imperia, victoriæ, quamquam fortuita sunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici possunt.

Chap. XXIII.

THE FUTURE.

1. Effugere nemo id potest, quod futurum est. Sæpe autem ne utile quidem est scire, quid futurum sit; miserum est enim, nihil proficientem angi, nec habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen commune solatium.

2. Medici, quamquam intelligunt sæpe, tamen nunquam ægris dicunt, illo morbo eos esse

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[6] Div. II. 28, 60. — [7] Off. II. 6, 20. — [1] N. D. III. 6, 14. — [2] Div. II. 25, 54.

morituros. Omnis enim prædictio mali tum probatur, quum ad prædictionem cautio adjungitur.

3. Ingenii magni est, præcipere cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, quum quid evenerit, nec committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit : "*Non putaram.*"

4. Ut in seminibus vis inest earum rerum, quæ ex iis progignuntur ; sic in causis conditæ sunt res futuræ, quas esse futuras aut concitata mens aut soluta somno cernit, aut ratio aut conjectura præsentit.

5. Medicus morbum ingravescentem ratione providet, insidias imperator, tempestates gubernator ; et tamen hi ipsi sæpe falluntur, qui nihil sine certa ratione opinantur : ut agricola, quum florem oleæ videt, bacam quoque se visurum putat ; non sine ratione ille quidem ; sed nonnunquam tamen fallitur. Quod si falluntur ii, qui nihil sine aliqua probabili conjectura ac ratione dicunt ; quid existimandum est de conjectura eorum, qui extis aut avibus aut ostentis aut oraculis aut somniis futura præsentiunt ?

6. Vetus illud Catonis admodum scitum est,

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[3] Off. I. 23, 81. — [4] Div. I. 56, 128. — [5] II. 6, 16. — [6] II. 24, 51.

qui mirari se aiebat, quod non rideret haruspex, haruspicem quum vidisset. Quota enim quæque res evenit prædicta ab istis ? aut si evenit quidpiam, quid afferri potest, cur non casu id evenerit ?

7. Rex Prusias, quum Annibali apud eum exsulanti depugnari placeret, negabat se audere, quod exta prohiberent. *An tu*, inquit, *carunculæ vitulinæ mavis quam imperatori veteri credere ?*

Chap. XXIV.

DEATH.

1. Pellantur istæ ineptiæ pæne aniles, ante tempus mori miserum esse.

2. Si ipsa ratio minus perficiet, ut mortem negligere possimus ; at vita acta perficiat, ut satis superque vixisse videamur.

3. O miserum senem, qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa ætate non viderit !

4. Hoc meditatum ab adolescentia debet esse, mortem ut negligamus ; sine qua meditatione

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[7] Div. II. 24, 52. —— [1] Tusc. I. 39, 93. — [2] I. 45, 109. — [3] Cato, 19, 66. — [4] 20, 74.

tranquillo esse animo nemo potest. Moriendum enim certe est, et id incertum, an eo ipso die.

5. Si quid tale acciderit, ut a deo denuntiatum videatur, ut exeamus e vita, læti et agentes gratias pareamus, emittique nos e custodia et levari vinclis arbitremur. Sin autem nihil denuntiabitur, eo tamen simus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis, nobis faustum putemus; nihilque in malis ducamus, quod sit vel a diis immortalibus vel a natura, parente omnium, constitutum.

6. Theophrastus moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam exiguam vitam dedisset.

7. Apud Hypanim fluvium, qui ab Europæ parte in Pontum influit, Aristoteles ait bestiolas quasdam nasci, quæ unum diem vivant. Ex his igitur hora octava quæ mortua est, provecta ætate mortua est; quæ vero occidente sole, decrepita; eo magis, si etiam solstitiali die. Confer nostram longissimam ætatem cum æternitate: in eadem propemodum brevitate, qua illæ bestiolæ, reperiemur.

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[5] Tusc. I. 49, 118. — [6] III. 28, 69. — [7] I. 39, 94.

8. Ex † vita ita discedo, tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam ex domo. Commorandi enim natura deversorium nobis, non habitandi dedit. O præclarum diem, quum ad illud divinum animorum concilium cœtumque proficiscar, quumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam!

9. *Socrates,*[8] quum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit; et quum pæne in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita est, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in cælum videretur escendere.

10. Quam me delectat Theramenes! quam elato animo est! Etsi enim flemus, quum legimus, tamen non miserabiliter vir clarus emoritur. Qui quum, conjectus in carcerem triginta jussu tyrannorum, venenum ut sitiens obduxisset, reliquum sic e poculo ejecit, ut id resonaret: quo sonitu reddito, arridens, *Propino,* inquit, *hoc pulchro Critiæ,* qui in eum fuerat teterrimus. Græci enim in conviviis solent nominare, cui poculum tradituri sint. Lusit vir egregius extremo spiritu, quum jam præcordiis conceptam mortem contineret.

11. Cyrenæum Theodorum, philosophum non ignobilem, nonne miramur? cui quum Lysima-

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[8] Cato, 23, 84. — [9] Tusc. I. 29, 71. — [10] I. 40, 96. — [11] I. 43, 102.

† Cato's words.

chus rex crucem minaretur, *Istis, quæso,* inquit, *ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis! Theodori quidem nihil interest, humine an sublime putescat.*

12. Præclare Anaxagoras; qui quum Lampsaci moreretur, quærentibus amicis, velletne Clazomenas in patriam, si quid accidisset, auferri: *Nihil necesse est,* inquit; *undique enim ad inferos tantumdem viæ est.*

13. Mulieres in India, quum est cujus earum vir mortuus, in certamen judiciumque veniunt, quam plurimum ille dilexerit; plures enim singulis solent esse nuptæ: quæ est victrix, ea læta, prosequentibus suis, una cum viro in rogum imponitur, illa victa mœsta discedit.

14. *Socrates* * quum de immortalitate animorum disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone, quemadmodum sepeliri vellet, *Multam vero,* inquit, *operam, amici, frustra consumpsi. Critoni enim nostro non persuasi, me hinc avolaturum, neque quidquam mei relicturum. Verumtamen, Crito, si me assequi potueris, aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videbitur, sepelito. Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrum, quum hinc excessero, consequetur.*

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[13] Tusc. I. 43, 104. — [13] V. 27, 78. — [14] I. 43, 103.

Chap. XXV.

PROPER DEPORTMENT

1. Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita, quæ aut quid sit, aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit.

2. Facilius est currentem, ut aiunt, incitare, quam commovere languentem.

3. Quæ crescentia perniciosa sunt, eadem sunt vitiosa nascentia.

4. Ut quisque est vir optimus, ita difficillime esse alios improbos suspicatur.

5. Fit, nescio quomodo, ut magis in aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur.

6. Cavendum est, ne quid in agendo dicendove facias, cujus imitatio rideatur.

7. In omnibus negotiis prius, quam aggrediare, adhibenda est præparatio diligens.

8. In omnibus officiis persequendis animi est adhibenda contentio. Ea est sola officii tamquam custodia.

9. Nulla vitæ pars vacare officio potest; in

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[1] Heren. IV. 17, 24. — [2] De Or. II. 44, 186. — [3] Tusc. V. 18, 41. — [4] Quint. Fr. I. 1, 4, 12. — [5] Off. I. 41, 46. — [6] Brut. 62, 225. — [7] Off. I. 21, 73. — [8] Tusc. II. 3, 55. — [9] Off. I. 2, 4.

eoque et colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis et in negligendo turpitudo.

10. Profecto studia nihil prosunt perveniendi aliquo, nisi illud, quod eo, quo intendas, ferat deducatque, cognoris.

11. Est aliquid, quod non oporteat, etiam si licet; quidquid vero non licet, certe non oportet.

12. Ludo et joco uti illo quidem licet; sed, sicut somno et quietibus ceteris tum, quum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus. Neque enim ita generati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti esse videamur; ad severitatem potius et ad quædam studia graviora atque majora.

13. Magna laus et grata hominibus, unum hominem elaborare in ea scientia, quæ sit multis profutura.

14. Quum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; quumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum: confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.

15. Quæ est in hominibus tanta perversitas, ut inventis frugibus glande vescantur?

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[10] De Or. I. 30, 135. — [11] Balb. 3, 8. — [12] Off. I. 29, 103. — [13] Muren. 9, 19. — [14] Off. I. 11, 34. — [15] Or. 9, 31.

16. Nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est, adversante et repugnante natura.

17. In primis constituendum est, quos nos et quales esse velimus, et in quo genere vitæ : quæ deliberatio est omnium difficillima. Ineunte enim adolescentia, quum est maxima imbecillitas consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus ætatis degendæ constituit, quod maxime adamavit. Itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, judicare.

Chap. XXVI.

MISCELLANEOUS SENTENCES.

1. *Carere* hoc significat, egere eo, quod habere velis. Inest enim velle in carendo. — Triste est nomen ipsum *carendi*, quia subjicitur hæc vis : habuit, non habet ; desiderat, requirit, indiget.

2. Movemur, nescio quo pacto, locis ipsis, in quibus eorum, quos diligimus aut admiramur, adsunt vestigia.

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[16] Off. I. 31, 110. — [17] I. 32, 117. — [1] Tusc. I. 36, 88. — [2] Leg. II. 2, 4.

3. Consuetudinis magna vis est. Pernoctant venatores in nive; in montibus uri se patiuntur.

4. Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit et in genere conservetur suo.

5. Quum omnibus horis aliquid atrociter fieri videmus aut audimus, etiam qui natura mitissimi sumus, assiduitate molestiarum sensum omnem humanitatis ex animis amittimus.

6. Fit plerumque, ut ii, qui boni quid volunt afferre, affingant aliquid, quo faciant id, quod nuntiant, lætius.

7. Quis nescit, primam esse historiæ legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? deinde ne quid veri non audeat? ne qua suspicio gratiæ sit in scribendo? ne qua simultatis? Hæc scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus.

8. Sunt, qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent; voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint molliores; gloriam negligant, frangantur infamia.

9. Ut iis bonis erigimur, quæ exspectamus; sic lætamur iis, quæ recordamur. Stulti autem malorum memoria torquentur; sapientes

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[3] Tusc. II. 17, 40. — [4] Fin. IV. 7, 16. — [5] Rosc. A. 53, 154. — [6] Phil. I. 3, 8. — [7] De Or. II. 15, 62. — [8] Off. I. 21, 71. — [9] Fin. I. 17, 57.

bona præterita, grata recordatione renovata, delectant.

10. *Stulti* * bona præterita non memineruntur, præsentibus non fruuntur, futura modo exspectant; quæ quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu: maximeque cruciantur, quum sero sentiunt, frustra se aut pecuniæ studuisse aut imperiis aut opibus aut gloriæ.

11. Valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quæ res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu, corporis tuendi causa, et prætermittentis voluptatibus.

12. O magna vis veritatis, quæ contra hominum ingenia, calliditatem, sollertiam, contraque fictas omnium insidias facile se per se ipsa defendat!

13. Quid videatur ei magnum in rebus humanis, cui æternitas omnis totiusque mundi nota sit magnitudo?

14. *Natura,** tamquam ceteris non sit habitura quod largiatur, si uni cuncta concesserit, aliud alii commodi, aliquo adjuncto incommodo, muneratur.

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[10] Fin. I. 18, 60. — [11] Off. II, 24, 86. — [12] Cæl. 26, 63. — [13] Tusc. IV. 17, 37. — [14] Inv. II. 1, 3.

15. Natura fert, ut eis faveamus, qui eadem pericula, quibus nos perfuncti sumus, ingrediantur.

16. Omnium rerum, ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius.

17. Ut non omnem frugem neque arborem in omni agro reperire possis; sic non omne facinus in omni vita nascitur. In urbe luxuries creatur: ex luxuria exsistat avaritia necesse est, ex avaritia erumpat audacia: inde omnia scelera ac maleficia gignuntur. Vita autem hæc rustica, quam tu agrestem vocas, parsimoniæ, diligentiæ, justitiæ magistra est.

18. Assentior Platoni, nihil tam facile in animos teneros atque molles influere, quam varios canendi sonos: quorum dici vix potest quanta sit vis in utramque partem. Namque et incitat languentes, et languefacit excitatos, et tum remittit animos tum contrahit.

19. Sensus interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et collocati sunt. Nam oculi tamquam speculatores altissimum locum obtinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere. Et aures, quum sonum percipere debeant, qui

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[15] Muren. 2, 4. — [16] Off. I. 42, 151. — [17] Rosc. A. 27, 75. — [18] Leg. II. 15, 38. — [19] N. D, II. 56, 140, to 57, 145.

natura sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatæ sunt. Itemque nares, eo quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt, et, quod cibi et potionis judicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutæ sunt. Jam gustatus, qui sentire eorum, quibus vescimur, genera debet, habitat in ea parte oris, qua esculentis et potulentis iter natura patefecit. Tactus autem toto corpore æquabiliter fusus est, ut omnes ictus omnesque minimos et frigoris et caloris appulsus sentire possimus. Atque ut in ædificiis architecti avertunt ab oculis naribusque dominorum ea, quæ profluentia necessario tetri essent aliquid habitura: sic natura res similes procul amandavit a sensibus.

Quis vero opifex præter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiam persequi potuisset in sensibus? Quæ primum oculos membranis tenuissimis vestivit et sæpsit: quas primum perlucidas fecit, ut per eas cerni posset; firmas autem, ut continerentur. Sed lubricos oculos fecit et mobiles, ut et declinarent, si quid noceret, et adspectum, quo vellent, facile converterent; aciesque ipsa, qua cernimus, quæ pupula vocatur, ita parva est, ut ea, quæ nocere possint, facile vitet; palpebræque, quæ sunt tegmenta oculorum, mollissimæ tactu, ne læderent aciem, aptissime factæ et ad claudendas pupulas, ne

quid incideret, et ad aperiendas; idque providit, ut identidem fieri posset cum maxima celeritate. Munitæque sunt palpebræ tamquam vallo pilorum, quibus et apertis oculis, si quid incideret, repelleretur, et somno conniventibus, quum oculis ad cernendum non egeremus, ut qui tamquam involuti quiescerent. Latent præterea utiliter et excelsis undique partibus sæpiuntur. Primum enim superiora superciliis obducta sudorem a capite et a fronte defluentem repellunt. Genæ deinde ab inferiore parte tutantur subjectæ leniterque eminentes. Nasusque ita locatus est, ut quasi murus oculis interjectus esse videatur.

Auditus autem semper patet; ejus enim sensu etiam dormientes egemus: a quo quum sonus est acceptus, etiam e somno excitamur. Flexuosum iter habet, ne quid intrare possit, si simplex et directum pateret; provisum etiam, ut, si qua minima bestiola conaretur irrumpere, in sordibus aurium tamquam in visco inhæresceret. Extra autem eminent quæ appellantur aures, et tegendi causa factæ tutandique sensus et ne adjectæ voces laberentur atque errarent, priusquam sensus ab his pulsus esset. Sed duros et quasi corneolos habent introitus multisque cum flexibus, quod his naturis relatus amplificatur sonus. Quocirca et in fidibus testudine resonatur aut cornu: et ex tortuosis locis et inclusis soni referuntur am-

pliores. Similiter nares, quæ semper propter necessarias utilitates patent, contractiores habent introitus, ne quid in eas, quod noceat, possit pervadere; humoremque semper habent ad pulverem multaque alia depellenda non inutilem. Gustatus præclare sæptus est; ore enim continetur, et ad usum apte et ad incolumitatis custodiam.

20. Quis hunc hominem dixerit, qui quum tam certos cæli motus, tam ratos astrorum ordines, tamque omnia inter se connexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem, eaque casu fieri dicat, quæ quanto consilio gerantur, nullo consilio assequi possumus? An quum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut sphæram, ut horas, ut alia permulta, non dubitamus, quin illa opera sint rationis: quum autem impetum cæli admirabili cum celeritate moveri vertique videamus, constantissime conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias, cum summa salute et conservatione rerum omnium: dubitamus, quin ea non solum ratione fiant, sed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione? Licet enim jam, remota subtilitate disputandi, oculis quodammodo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum, quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.

Ac principio terra universa cernatur, locata

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[20] N. D. II. 38, 97, to 39, 101.

in media mundi sede, solida et globosa, et undique ipsa in sese nutibus suis conglobata, vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus. Quorum omnium incredibilis multitudo, insatiabili varietate distinguitur. Adde huc fontium gelidas perennitates, liquores perlucidos amnium, riparum vestitus viridissimos, speluncarum concavas altitudines, saxorum asperitates, impendentium montium altitudines, immensitatesque camporum: adde etiam reconditas auri argentique venas, infinitamque vim marmoris. Quæ vero, et quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum! qui volucrum lapsus atque cantus! qui pecudum pastus! quæ vita silvestrium! Quid jam de hominum genere dicam? qui quasi cultores terræ constituti, non patiuntur eam nec immanitate beluarum efferari, nec stirpium asperitate vastari: quorumque operibus agri, insulæ, littoraque collucent, distincta tectis et urbibus. Quæ si, ut animis, sic oculis videre possemus, nemo, cunctam intuens terram, de divina ratione dubitaret. At vero quanta maris est pulchritudo! quæ species universi! quæ multitudo et varietas insularum! quæ amœnitates orarum et littorum! quot genera, quamque disparia partim submersarum, partim fluitantium et innantium beluarum, partim ad saxa nativis testis inhærentium! Ipsum autem mare sic

terram appetens littoribus alludit, ut una ex duabus naturis conflata videatur. Exinde mari finitimus aër die et nocte distinguitur: isque tum fusus et extenuatus sublime fertur, tum autem concretus in nubes cogitur, humoremque colligens terram auget imbribus: tum effluens huc et illuc, ventos efficit. Idem annuas frigorum et calorum facit varietates: idemque et volatus alitum sustinet, et spiritu ductus alit et sustentat animantes.